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Abstract
The Energy Research Advisory Board, the group of external scientific advisors
that provided impartial expert advice to the Secretary of Energy since 1978, was
disbanded this May. The Administration, like its predecessors, regularly
replaces experts on agency advisory panels with ideologues and political allies.
We are at the nadir of a historical progression since World War II away from
trust in and use of scientific expertise in policymaking. This shift however, has
not been countered with greater public participation. Instead, administrative law
and theory have developed a model of the managerial administrative authority.
The "expertocratic" agency relies on internal expertise in order to develop policy
in the public interest. This is nowhere more the case than in the United States
Patent and Trademark Office where the need for secrecy surrounding patent
applications has entrenched a conception of the agency as expert. While the first
patent examiner, Thomas Jefferson, consulted Joseph Hutchinson, Professor of
Chemistry on March 12, 1791 to seek his advice in connection with a patent on an
alchemical process, modern patent examiners labor independently under a
backlog of 1 million applications with no more than 18-20 hours to decide on the
20 year grant of monopoly rights. The patentability determination, as much if not
more so than any regulatory rulemaking by the EPA or FDA, depends upon
knowledge of science. Yet examiners lack the requisite knowledge to examine
patents adequately. Examiners are prohibited from consulting outside sources,
often including the Internet. Still over 90% of applications are granted. This
paper argues that the distrust of scientific expertise produces an information
deficit that results in poor quality patents. It views patent examination as a case
study, illuminating a general problem with administrative policymaking, namely
the lack of accountability to and input from scientific experts. The Article puts
forward a solution: “open review.” Under this model, scientific experts provide
input to the agency by means of an online network; that expertise is directly tied
to ultimate legal decision-making. Unlike ordinary peer review, called for in the
Information Quality Act, open review adopts a broader vision of collaborative
expertise that cannot be manipulated. By being both more expert and more
participatory, it avoids the problems described in the literature on science in
policymaking. Unlike other proposals for ex post patent reform, open review
addresses the core problem of information deficit that cannot be solved by the
courts. At this juncture when patent reform is uncertain to move either through
Congress or the US Supreme Court, focusing our attention on the role of
scientific expertise in agency practice may be our best opportunity, not only to
bring about much-needed reform, but to do so in ways that are data-driven and
empirically measurable. The United States Patent and Trademark Office agrees
with the assessment: it will implement a pilot of open review in 2007.
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Introduction
There is a crisis of patent quality. Vague, overbroad patents lacking in
novelty that fail the constitutional mandate of “promoting the progress of science
and the useful arts”1 are being issued. The grant of a high volume of patents
(over 350,000 a year) at a staggering rate (upwards of 90% of patent applications
are granted) produces increasing uncertainty about their merit.

Low quality

patents risk litigation and confer the economic rewards of monopoly with little
benefit to the public.2

In a recent empirical study, “Determinants of Patent

Quality: An Empirical Analysis”3 Columbia Professor Bhaven Sampat analyzes

*

Assoc. Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Information Law and Policy, New York Law
School. Visiting Professor, Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania. McClatchy Visiting
Assoc. Prof., Communications Dep’t., Stanford University. Please note, all footnotes are long
form to faciliate subsequent editing.

1

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

2

ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 2 (2004) (“Thus, the
patent system – intended to foster and protect innovation – is generating waste and
uncertainty that hinders and threatens the innovative process.”). See also A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 70 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, and Mark B.
Myers, eds., 2004). See also, Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In
Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1227-36 (2004);
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496
(2001); Editorial: The Problem with Patents, WALL ST. J., March 29, 2006, at 18.
3

Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis (2006)
(unpublished article manuscript available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf).
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the dataset of prior art references from 502,687 utility patents issued between
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2003. He finds that “patent examiners have a
comparative disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art and foreign
patents, suggesting that all else equal [sic], patents are likely to be of lower
quality for technological areas for which most prior art is not embodied in U.S.
patents.”4

Patent examiners are currently trying to make decisions about a

twenty-year5 grant of monopoly rights that will shape an industry on the basis of
information contained only in the USPTO’s internal databases.6 Examiners may
not consult the public nor may they talk to experts or, in most cases, even use
Google.

The information upon which examiners may rely in making a

determination is further limited by poor or ambiguous drafting by applicants
and the fact that there is no onus upon those applying for a patent to supply
adequate information to the examiner. The costs of searching fall to the Patent
Office alone.7
As James Rumsey remarked in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1789, the
issuance of patents is “more within the information of a board of academical
4

Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (2006)
(unpublished article manuscript available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf)..

5

Patent Act, 35 USC §154(a)(2) (2004) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title,
such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and
ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the
United States…”).

6

U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURES (MPEP) § 902.03(e) (8th ed. 2004) (“The automated search tools on
examiners' desktop computers include the Examiner's Automated Search Tool (EAST),
the Web-Based Examiner Search Tool (WEST), and the Foreign Patent Access System
(FPAS).”)
7

Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173 (2006) (arguing that we must
reduce the information costs of searching imposed upon the Patent Office).
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professors, and a previous refusal of a patent would better guard our citizens
against harassments by lawsuits.”8 Yet today’s patent system replaces expert
“academical” input with the centralized and isolated expert-bureaucrat
evaluating applications on the basis of a legal fiction, namely from the viewpoint
of the “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art” (PHOSITA) in whose shoes he
is expected to stand.

9

The information deficit that plagues the Patent Office is a common
problem faced by other government agencies as well. There is an
institutionalized culture endemic to government that forecloses outside input10
and produces an information deficit. There is a prevailing distrust of public
participation and of scientific expertise, specifically. As Wendy Wagner writes,

8

E.C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, in 40 ESSAYS IN HISTORY
(1998) (quoting Letter, James Rumsey to Thomas Jefferson, dated June 6, 1789, in THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Julian P. Boyd et al., Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950 at 15:171-2).
9

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004). See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Ideas Into Action:
Implementing Reform of the Patent System: Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERK. TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004) (“[T]his language seems to call
for evaluations of non-obviousness from the perspective of ordinary practitioners who
are contemporaries of the inventor in the relevant technological community. It specifies a
point in time as of which the obviousness of the invention should be evaluated (‘at the
time the invention was made’) and designates the person whose judgment of
obviousness should control (‘to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains’ or PHOSITA), as well as directing attention to ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art.’”)
10

Beth Simone Noveck, Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 Emory L.J. 433, 450
(2004) (“The APA's spare public consultation provisions have institutionalized the deepseated belief that the public, especially unorganized individuals or small interest groups,
is an irritant - the pea to the agency's princess - unduly influencing and burdening the
expert who alone possesses the knowledge and impartial sangfroid to govern in the
public interest.”). See also, Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 217 (1997)
(critiquing value of public participation); See also CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 178—79 (2 ed. 1999) (describing
patterns of participation and contending that, for a variety of reasons, participation in
rulemaking is not particularly common or frequent.).
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“attempts to incorporate science into environmental regulations have met with
failure. Reduced public participation, excessive regulatory delays, and the
incomplete and inaccurate incorporation of science have plagued science-based
environmental regulation for nearly three decades.”11 The conviction in currency
is that outside sources of scientific information compromise agency impartiality
and democratic legitimacy. Government agencies have come to rely increasingly
on internal expertise to the exclusion of science; science understood in the broad
meaning of a certain kind of knowledgeable expert adhering to the professional
values dictated by the scientific method. The Patent Office, on which we focus, is
but the paradigmatic example of the challenge of making complex decisions
without the benefit of adequate information.

The solutions we propose,

therefore, can apply to the reform of patents as well as to rememdy the
information deficit at other agencies. Hence the normative analysis should be of
interest to intellectual property and administrative law scholars and practitioners
alike.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office is the epitome of a
dysfunctional conception of expertise in our administrative culture. The earlier
need for secrecy surrounding patent applications12 further entrenched the culture
of agency-as-expert and the practice of rejecting scientific input. While the first
11

Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1614 (1995).
12

Prior to the enactment of the rules on publication in 1999, all applications were kept
secret for the duration of prosecution. Patent Act, 35 USC §122 (a) (2004) (providing for
confidentiality and secrecy of patent applications); Patent Act, 35 USC §122(b) (2004)
(providing for publication at 18 months); see also U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT
OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) §1120 (8th ed.
2004) (“Nonprovisional utility and plant applications: are published promptly after
eighteen months from the earliest filing date for which application benefit is sought.”).
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patent examiner, Thomas Jefferson, consulted Joseph Hutchinson, Professor of
Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, on March 12, 1791 to seek his
advice in connection with a patent on an alchemical process,13 this consultative
and open vision of patent review subsequently gave way to our modern system
of closed patent examination.
Today 4,000 patent examiners

14

labor independently under a backlog

approaching 1 million applications15 with no more than 18-20 hours16 to review
each one. The patentability determination, as much if not more so than any
regulatory rulemaking by the EPA, depends upon knowledge of science. Yet
examiners lack the requisite information to examine patents adequately: there is
13

LEONARD WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 137 (1948)
(quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson, dated 12 March 1791 reprinted in THE THOMAS
JEFFERSON PAPERS 1606-1827 at the Library of Congress, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/index.html).
14

There are currently 4,000+ patent examiners with plans to increase that number to
7,200 in order to address the backlog. See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71
Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006) (In FY 2006, the USPTO plans to hire 1,200 patent professionals,
and in years FY 2007 – FY 2012, we plan to hire at least 1,000 a year, for a total of at least
7,200 patent examiner hires in 7 years. This level of hiring is a critical component of the
plans to address patent pendency regardless of the time frame for such improvements.
Notwithstanding these massive hiring efforts, in the absence of other changes to the
current examination system only modest gains in reducing patent pendency are likely to
be achieved in the near term. In fact, until these new hires are effectively absorbed into
the examination system, average patent pendency will continue to increase.).

15

At the end of 2005, the number of pending patent applications was 885,002 and rising.
See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm.; U.S.P.T.O.
Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2005: Other Accompanying
Information: Table 3: Patent Applications Pending Prior To Allowance, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060403_table3.html.
16

Kevin Maney, Examiners Can’t Keep Up With Patent Applications, USA TODAY, June 15,
2005, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/kevinmaney/2005-09-20-patentoffice_xhtml (quoting John Doll, Commissioner for Patents, USPTO). U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H.R. REP NO. GAO-05-720, THE USPTO HAS MADE PROGRESS IN
HIRING EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO RETENTION REMAIN (2005) (depending on the
type of patent and the skill level of the examiner, each examiner is expected to process an
average of 87 applications per year at a rate of 19 hours per application). See also, Brenda
Sandburg, Speed Over Substance?, INTELL. PROP. MAGAZINE (March 1999).
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either too little information about prior inventions on file – as in the case of
computer software patents – or too much information – as in the case of
biotechnology – without the means to sort it. There is no continuing science
education at the USPTO and no dialogue with the scientific community.
This paper argues that abjuring input from and accountability17 to outside
scientific expertise produces problems at the Patent Office and across agencies
with information quality and information transparency.

The central insight is

that distrust of science creates an information deficit that, in turn, produces poor
quality patents and problematical agency rulemakings. The reluctance to use
science translates into undue reliance on centralized structures of expertise and
decision making.

The distrust of outside expertise is magnified by the

concomitant difficultly with engaging experts effectively and efficiently,
compounding the informational deficit and turning the patent quality problem
into a problem of information access.18

17

Temina Madon, Congress 101: Teaching Scientists The Language Of Policymakers, 6 BERK.
SCI. REV. 43, 44 (Spring 2006) (“Many scientists drawn into the world of policy share a
sense that greater numbers of researchers should be involved in the decision-making
process. Bruce Alberts, a biochemistry professor at UC San Francisco and former
President of the National Academies, has been a strong advocate for the role of science in
policy. During his tenure at the Academies he helped establish fellowship programs that
bring scientists and engineers to Capitol Hill, with the goal of influencing lawmakers and
convincing them to embrace evidence-based approaches in their work.”).
18

For another perspective on the information problem of patents, see Lee Petherbridge,
Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173 (2006) (focusing on the information costs associated
with defining the boundaries of a patent and arguing that the failure on the part of the
Patent Office to collect sufficient information from applicant is interfering with the ability
to efficiently and reproducibly construct a consistent understanding of the boundaries of
the patented property. “So viewed, transactions involving questionable patents, and
indeed transactions involving all patents, can be productively considered as problems of
information costs and information cost allocation.” ). See also see Clarisa Long,
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004).

9
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The dearth of information, as this Article argues, cannot be solved
through judicial review. Contrary to the prevailing theory ,“Daubert-izing”19
agency decision-making and changing the current standard of judicial review (or
rather lowering the high degree of deference and lack of review) of agency
decisions based on science is too slow, too intermittent and too late in the game
to solve the problem. Judicial review comes too late in the process to remedy the
informational deficit, especially as judicial review has to await first a 2-5 year
review process at the Patent Office itself.

20

Judicial review cannot address the

question of how policymakers should account for the uncertainty of scientific
conclusions and still follow principles of sound science. It does not address how
to base decisions on quality information without sacrificing democratic
legitimacy.
Other reform proposals that call for ex post solutions, such as post-grant
administrative review to “gold-plate” important patents, as Lemley, Lichtman
and Sampat propose,21 still require improved mechanisms for getting at the
information necessary to make the patentability determination. Even proposals
to change the statutory standards of patent examination and revisit the scope of
patentable subject matter or the definition of obviousness do not obviate the need

19

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Alan Charles Raul
and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (2003).

20

Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help. 19 BERK. TECH. L. J., 1 (2004).

21

Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman and Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad Patents?,
28 REGULATION 10-13 (2005-6) (arguing for post-grant opposition, "a process by which
parties other than the applicant would have the opportunity to request and fund a
thorough examination of a recently issued patent.").
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to address the grave problem of information deficit. Even where there have been
proposals to require applicants to perform more thorough searches, the applicant
may lack the incentive and the knowledge to find all the relevant information.
Instead, this Article puts forward a normative proposal for a new reform
model22 that might revolutionize the process of patent examination.

It is a

necessary precursor to all other patent reform proposals because it goes to this
central question of the use of scientific information. This proposal for what we
shall term “open review” or “open examination” separates scientific from legal
decision-making and distributes the former to an external expert community by
means of an online network. The scientific community provides informational
input about what it knows best and, most important, those contributions are
directly tied to the ultimate legal determination. The patent examiner with her
deep knowledge of the legal standards of patentability remains the ultimate
arbiter.

Creating this network of scientific expertise, by means of new

technology, would not eliminate the agency official nor would it shield the
scientist from political decision-making. This has the potential to remedy the
information deficit and improve patent quality.
The crux of this normative proposal is to go beyond more traditional peer
review (e.g. as called for by the Information Quality Act23) or a science-centered
NGO watchdog (e.g. ScienceWatch24) and invoke a broader and more transparent

22

The proposal is outlined in detail at Beth Simone Noveck,“Peer to Patent”: Community
Patent Proposal (April 2006), available at
http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/proposals.html.

23

Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a) (2001).

24

E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45,
53 (2003) (“Perhaps it is time for science qua science to get into the game by organizing a
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vision of open and collaborative expertise. We have both the tools and the
know-how that enable us to organize open networks of expert participation in
governmental decision making. Open examination has the advantage of being
both more expert and more participatory while avoiding the lack of
transparency, that plagues traditional peer review. With open examination, we
can, first, improve patent quality by opening up review to the scientific
community to remedy the information deficit, and, subsequently, apply the same
approach to administrative decision making generally. This proposal has farreaching implications for the ways we might use scientific expertise in
policymaking.
By redesigning the model for patent examination, this proposal points the
way forward toward a new approach for administrative law, not by “Daubertizing” judicial review nor by reforming statutory standards but by improving
25

agency institutional practice.

Introducing technology to bring about open

review, instead of peer review, might enhance the institutional competence of the

nongovernmental organization of independent environmental scientists whose only
common interest is speaking up for the integrity of science in the process. For purposes
of discussion, I will call this imaginary new entity "Science Watch."”).
25

Current reform proposals include altering the definition of patentable subject matter,
changing the definition of obviousness, abolishing the concept of constructive reduction
to practice, narrowing the scope of willful infringement, changing the standards of
judicial review and the presumption of patent validity and curtailing the availability of
injunctions. Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent Reform,
Section B2 “Doctrinal Reform,” Aug 12, 2006, (unpublished manuscript available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc) (discussing
substantive statutory reform proposals). See also Jay Dratler, Invention is a Process, or Why
the Electronics and Pharmaceutical Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents, Aug. 12, 2006,
unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Dratler.doc (calling for
abolition of constructive reduction to practice and changing the non-obviousness
standard).
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Patent Office itself. At this juncture when patent reform is uncertain to move
either through Congress26 or the US Supreme Court,27 changing the
administrative practices of the agency responsible for implementing patent law
may be our best opportunity, not only to bring about reform, but also to do so in
ways that are data-driven and empirically measurable.
The United States Patent Office announced in its strategic plan (20072012) that it will pilot this proposal (on the basis of an earlier draft of this Article)
and institute its use for a controlled set of patents to be examined beginning in
2007.28 Companies, including IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Intel, Hewlett-Packard,
and Red Hat have agreed to submit their patents for examination under this
open system.
Like the work of Arti Rai and Stuart Benjamin, this Article contends that
drawing the comparison between patent examination and administrative
practice, while giving rise to the complexities inherent in comparative work, is
normatively desirable. Seeing patent examination as a case study of the way
science is used in the administrative context shifts our focus to the institutional

26

Recent proposed but as yet not enacted legislative proposals include: The Patent
Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); The Patents Depend on Quality Act,
H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); The Patent Litigation Pilot, H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2006).
Patent lawyer, academic and blogger, Prof. Dennis Crouch writes: “Substantive patent
reform legislation is dead for the year.” Patently-O Weblog,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/07/patent_reform_i.html (July 28, 2006).
27

Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 11248 (Fed. Cir., 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2976 (June 30, 2006) (dismissing writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted). While the Supreme Court has heard other patentrelated cases this year,, the much-anticipated case reviewing the substantive scope of
patentability was not heard.

28

See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm (discussing patent
application peer review pilot).
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competence of the agency and highlights new opportunities for patent reform.29
Drawing the explicit connections between USPTO and general agency practices30
makes clear that at issue here is not only better quality patents, but more
scientifically informed decisions and, thus, a stronger and more legitimate
democracy.
There is a substantial administrative policy literature on the role of
31
scientific expertise and the mechanisms by which agencies procure (or not)

information to inform decision making. Because patents used to be confidential
29

Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System
can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEORGETOWN L. J. ___ (2006). Also available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897307. See also, Kristen Osenga,
Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes – Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion
in the Patent Office, 33 Fl. St. U. L. Rev. 119 (2005) (proposing mult-tiered patent
application and examination system); Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERK. TECH. L. J. (2004) (arguing that judicial
review cannot fix the patent problem alone and urging better USPTO funding and higher
standards of initial review, better incentives (not limited to formal duties) for applicants
to find and disclose prior art information, and the creation of a cheap and workable
administrative post-issue review.).
30

For another proposal that takes patent law in its administrative context, see Kali N.
Murray, Rules for Radicals, (August 11, 2006 ) (unpublished manuscript, presented at IP
Scholars Conference, Berkeley, California) (arguing that three key mechanisms—
expanded standing, citizen suits, and transparency—which allow environmental law to
maintain a robust participation of diverse constituencies, are absent from patent law.),
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Murray.doc.

31

See Special Issue: AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, Scientific Evidence in Public Policymaking (Vol.
95, S1, July 2005). PHILIP KITCHNER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY (2001); BRUCE L.R.
SMITH, THE ADVISERS: SCIENTISTS IN THE POLICY PROCESS 1 (1992); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE
FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS (1990); Dagmar Lohan, A Framework
For Assessing the Input of Scientific Information Into Global Decisionmaking, 17 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 17625 (2006); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands:
The Limits Of Science In Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004); Wendy
Wagner, Science in the Regulatory Process: The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming The Debate
Over The Role Of Science In Public Health And Environmental Regulation 66 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 63 (2003); Jerry Mashaw, Science In The Regulatory Process: Law And Engineering: In
Search Of The Law-Science Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 135 (2003); Daniel C. Esty,
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1495 (1999); Wendy Wagner,
The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613(1995). See also
BRUNO LATOUR, THE POLITICS OF NATURE: HOW TO BRING THE SCIENCES INTO DEMOCRACY
(2004); POLITICIZING SCIENCE: THE ALCHEMY OF POLICYMAKING (William Hough, ed. 2003).
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and not published,32 little of this literature describes the intellectual property
system per se. Hence the goal of Part II is to set forth the arguments against the
use of external scientific expertise. We want to understand the perceived
problems with science as a tool for policymaking that have led to its disuse and
the resulting information deficit. Again, by science we are referring to relevant
outside expertise and experience not experimental verification per se.

The

perception of science as problematical has resulted in institutional processes that
deprive agencies of information.
In Part III, we demonstrate how the distrust of science is producing an
information deficit that hampers patent examination. It argues that the patent
crisis – whether the problem of patent quality or simply the lack of efficiency in
the process – is directly caused, not by faulty standards but by a lack of
information in the examination process.
In Part IV, we discuss why traditional peer review is not a solution to the
informational deficit because it lacks transparency, has a closed vision of
expertise and places undue burdens on scientists and agency officials alike. As
traditionally practiced, it also comes too late in the game to be useful to remedy
the information deficit that impedes quality decision making.
Part V of this paper lays out the proposal for open peer review and
argues for opening up governmental processes, not to input from authenticated
experts, but to the community that collectively is likely to have the knowledge
32

In 1999, the Patent Law was amended to provide for publication of patent applications
after eighteen months (with exceptions), Intellectual Property and Communications
Omnibus Reform Act 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999). The law amended these sections
of the patent act concerning confidentiality and publication. 35 USC § 102(e), 35 USC §
199(b), 35 USC § 122, 35 USC § 154 and 35 USC § 374 (2004).
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and experience required to inform decision making. This section explains how
open review addresses the problems, not only with the use of science in
policymaking but with peer review as it has traditionally been practiced. Unlike
other theoretical proposals for reform, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office will pilot this “Peer to Patent” model in practice in 2007. Open review
combines the transparency and self-selection of public participation with the
information criticality and expertise of peer review. Metaphorically speaking, it
marries the practices of Wikipedia to the authority of administrative law. 33
Finally, we conclude with a section on institutional competence, putting
forth the claim that by applying technology to improve the patent examination
process itself, we are, in fact, able to bring about law reform faster and more
effectively than traditional strategies that regard Congress and the courts as the
only institutional mechanisms for reform. Where Congress has failed to pass
reform legislation and the Supreme Court has declined to review the scope of
patentable subject matter, Community Patent Review is being adopted in
practice. Patent examination is urgently in need of improvement to remedy the
informational deficit that gives rise to low quality patents. At the same time, the
empirical lessons to be learned from reforming the institution of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office promise to redound to the benefit, not only
of intellectual property law and policy, but of administrative rulemaking more

33

Nicholas Varchaver, Patent Review Goes Wiki, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 18,
available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/08/21/8383639/ind
ex.htm?source=yahoo_quote.
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broadly. Open review offers the structure by which to tie public participation to
governmental decision-making in ways that are manageable and useful, allowing
us to reintroduce science into lawmaking while, at the same time, preserving its
democratic legitimacy.

Part II: The Use of Science in Policymaking: Arguments For and Against

The Energy Research Advisory Board, the group of external scientific
advisors that provided impartial expert advice to the Secretary of Energy since
1978, was disbanded this May.

The current Administration regularly replaces

experts on agency advisory panels with ideologues and political allies. “The
Bush administration for years has been stung by criticism that it has censored
government scientists, manipulated research results, and conducted political
"litmus tests" of prospective scientific advisory board members,” reports The
Scientist Magazine.34 On February 18, 2004, 62 preeminent scientists including
Nobel laureates, National Medal of Science recipients, former senior advisers to
administrations of both parties, numerous members of the National Academy of
Sciences, and other well-known researchers released a statement titled Restoring
Scientific Integrity in Policy Making. In this statement, the scientists charged the
Bush administration with widespread and unprecedented “manipulation of the

34

Ted Agres, Panel Faults U.S. Science Policy National Science Board Finds Lack of Consistent
Policy for Exchange of Government Research, THE SCIENTIST, June 6, 2006, available at
http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/23575/.
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process through which science enters into its decisions.”35 This is not an entirely
new practice. The EPA Administrator under Reagan fired most of the scientists
on its Science Advisory Board and replaced them with Republicans.36 Every year
government agencies, especially the EPA, are accused of playing politics37 under
the guise of science and depriving themselves of access to outside information.
We are at the nadir of a historical progression since World War II away
from trust in scientific expertise in policymaking. Or, more accurately,
administrative agencies have brought scientific research in-house, relying on
internal expertise and using the scientific profession largely to validate research
after-the fact. Because of a prevailing distrust of science and the belief that, to be
democratically legitimate, agency decision making must be performed by the
agency and not by outsiders, we are evolving increasingly ill-informed
government institutions. “Although good science is crucial to sound, efficient,
and effective regulations, agency decisions too often either disregard scientific
evidence or reflect public policy considerations merely masked as science.”38
This Section unpacks the arguments for and against the use of science in
policymaking. While not focused on patents, specifically, it is crucial to the

35

Union of Concerned Scientists Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An
Investigation into the Bush Administration Misuse of Science, March 2004, available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/RSI_final_fullreport_1.p
df

36

E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
45, 46 (2003).

37

Union of Concerned Scientists Report, Surveys of Scientists at Federal Agencies (showing
pervasive pattern of political interference) (last updated, March 2, 2006), available at
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/fda-scientist-survey.html.
38

Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 9 (2003).
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theory about information deficit and to the policy proposal to understand the
sources of the prevailing distrust of science and reluctance to use outside
information.
Proponents marshal numerous arguments in support of the use of
scientific expertise in policymaking. First and foremost among these contentions
is that science remedies the democratic deficit of agencies by tempering
discretion and tethering it to objective fact. The scientific elite, unlike agency
officials, is insulated from the political fray and less prone to be unduly
influenced. Reducing regulatory discretion is, at least in theory, a prime mover
for including scientists in the policymaking processes. Second, science informs
policymaking with fact. Fact-based policymaking ensures that we make rational
decisions in the public interest to enhance public safety and well-being.

We

want to know that the rules we make will work. That requires basing them in
some sort of predictive scientific fact. Third, with the rise in the amount and
scope of regulation over the years,39 it is, arguably, important that those rules be
based on empirical reality that comes from the scientific method.

While

legislation is a question of values, regulation, so the argument goes, must take
those value-based decisions made by Congress and apply them to concrete facts.
39

CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF
THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 9 fig.6 (2003) (illustrating the number of Federal
Register pages from 1993 to 2002). According to figures compiled from the National
Archives and Records Administration, 4187 rules were proposed in 2002. See also
CORNEULIS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MAKE LAW AND WRITE
POLICY (1994). Kerwin cites the following: in 1981 there were 6,481 rules published,
in1991, there were 4,413 rules published, in 2001 there were 19,643 rules published. To
understand the growth of rulemaking practice, however, it is illustrative to look at the
number of pages of regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations. In 1938, the page
count was, for example, 1, 174 for agriculture, 39 for labor and no environmental
regulations (there was no EPA). By 2001, that number was 10,406 for agriculture, 5,385
for labor and 19,385 pages of environmental rulemaking activity.
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The decision about the number of parts per billion of asbestos or lead in the air
and water should not be made democratically but based on scientific know-how
as to what is safe. Science helps to translate the democratic mandate from the
statute to create a clean environment into a set of considered practical standards
and practices. Since the role of agencies is to collect the data necessary to set
those standards, rather than to pronounce general laws, science has an important
role to play here. 40
Paying lip service to the importance of good science and quality
information, says little about the institutional mechanisms or structures by which
science is integrated into governance. There is a fourth rationale that proposes
greater accountability to and decision making by the scientists because of their
unique mindset.

Pro-science advocates suggest that scientific professionals

should play a greater role in decision making processes.

Because of their

adherence to the scientific method and its rigors, scientists stand in a special
position, not only to withstand political influence, but to weigh complex
questions of policymaking with impartiality. "I offer a conception of the scientist
as artisan,” writes historian of science Arnold Pacey, “as a worker capable of
offering to the broader community something of genuine value, whose
contributions can be, and should be, responsive to a much wider range of
concerns than are usually taken to be appropriate.”41

In Francis Bacon's New

Atlantis, Bacon describes the island of Bensalem. "Here mariners are treated with
great hospitality, and they are surprised by the wisdom and generosity, and
40

SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 4 (1990).

41

ARNOLD PACEY, TECHNOLOGY IN WORLD CIVILIZATION, 4 (1991).
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incorruptibility of the island's government." The leadership is founded upon the
institution of an "elite group of investigators.”42 Whether intended as a parody or
not, Bacon expresses the belief that as a profession, science because of the rigors
of its method, is a foundation for good government. This deference to expertise
stands in contrast to the narrower view of Sheila Jasanoff. She (and others) take
the view that scientific expertise is particularly valuable, not in all circumstances,
but when there is a problem to be solved with a well-defined scope, there is
complex data required but not formulations of basic policy. These conceptions,
43

despite their contrasts, view the scientific expert as standing in a special position
to inform the processes of governance and provide the political official with
policymaking options.44

Even where people disagree about the model of

governance and whether competence ought to reside with federal, state or local
officials, good scientific information can produce better decisions at every level.
For every argument in favor, there are, however, at least two against.
The role of science in policymaking is waning.

This is not to suggest that

agencies do not use science, merely that it is considered a necessary but not
sufficient ingredient of regulation. This, in turn, is leading to a reluctance to
42

PHILIP KITCHNER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY, 7 (2001).

43

SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS,10-11 (1990).

44

Roger Pielke, Jr., When Scientists Politicize Science, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 28 (A
better alternative is for the scientific community to take some responsibility to address
the policy significance of scientific results. This would mean not simply seeking to better
“communicate” the results of science to the policymaker, but developing the capability to
place science into policy context, i.e., to address the question of what policy alternatives
are consistent with and inconsistent with scientific results. If the scientific community
wishes to claim independence from partisan politics, then with this comes an obligation
to provide independent guidance on the significance of science for a wide scope of policy
alternatives. Instead of the futile effort to keep science and politics separate, it may make
more sense to ask scientists to engage more substantively in policy debate, not by taking
sides but instead by serving as “honest brokers of policy options.”).
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consult outside experts and an information deficit. Legislative considerations,
not science, are meant to determine the regulatory agenda. Former EPA General
Counsel E. Donald Elliott has documented the "decline of science as an important
determinant in environmental decision making."45 We are replacing scientific
experts with political appointees.46 Even with the additional Federal Advisory
47
48
49
Committees and Science Boards and peer review mandates, the emerging

trend over the last fifty years is away from reliance on extra-agency input. This
is perhaps the reason it was necessary to enact an executive order to mandate its

E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,125, 10,126 (2001).
45

Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 11 (2003) (“Through detailed reports and analyses, the General
Accounting Office ("GAO") has consistently documented EPA's faulty scientific methods
as well as its practice of obscuring the policy-based reasons for some of its decisions.
GAO recently noted concern among observers ‘about whether [EPA and other] agencies'
procedures and assumptions are sufficiently transparent, thereby providing decisionmakers and the public with adequate information about the scientific and policy bases
for agencies' risk estimates as well as the limitations and uncertainties associated with
those estimates.’ GAO has also cited gaps and inaccuracies in EPA data that further
compromise the agency's ability to assess risks and set risk-based priorities. These gaps,
in part, explain EPA's heavy reliance on assumptions.”)
46

Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C., App 2 6(c) (1972).
There are over 800 Federal Advisory Committees today. The Federal Advisory
Committee Database is available at http://fido.gov/facadatabase/. See also, The
Twenty-Seventh Annual Report to the President on Federal Advisory Committees, U.S.
General Services Administration, available at
http://fido.gov/facadatabase/printedannualreports%5C1998TwentySeventh%20Annual%20Report%20Of%20The%20President%20On%20Federal%2
0Advisory%20Committees.pdf. Additional documents on peer review available on the
Office of Management and Budget website on Information Policy, E-Gov and IT, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infopoltech.html.
47

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA’S SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD PANELS: IMPROVED
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES NEEDED TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE, GAO-01-536
(2001); Robert F. Blomquist, Integrated Pollution Control: A Symposium: & Article: The Epa
Science Advisory Board's Report On "Reducing Risk": Some Overarching Observations
Regarding The Public Interest, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 149 (1992).
48

See Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, ISSUANCE OF OMB’S FINAL
INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW, OMB Memorandum M-05-03 (Dec. 16,
2004).
49
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consideration. Executive Order 12,866 enacted in 1993 declared that “each agency
shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical,
economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of,
the intended regulation.”50
What are the arguments, therefore, against relying on too much scientific
expertise or creating mechanisms for greater accountability to the scientific
profession? How did we get to this point of entrenched distrust of scientific
expertise?
While proponents laud the use of expertise as a remedy to democratic
deficiencies, critics point out that scientific expertise is both undemocratic and
unaccountable.

Science, like managerial expertise, cannot and should not

substitute for democratic decision-making. It can inform policymaking with fact
but the “reality is,” writes environmental activist and administrative law scholar
David Schoenbrod, “that science is surprisingly uncertain.”51

Rarely does

consensus exist around regulatory issues such as environmental hazards.

Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4,
1993).

50

As Harvard administrative law scholar, Gerald Frug notes, this was the era of the
“expertise model” of governance that legitimated bureaucracy in a democracy by
reference to its positivist groundings. Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1283-84 (1984) (“Progressives and certain New Dealers-including organization theorists like Philip Selznick, corporate managerialists like
Chester Barnard, Elton Mayo, Peter Drucker, and Douglas McGregor, and
administrative law scholars like Woodrow Wilson and James Landis -- agreed with the
charge that bureaucracies were not in fact controlled by commands issued from outside.
They recognized the enormous range of discretion exercised by bureaucratic managers;
indeed, they argued that this discretion was not only an unavoidable ingredient of
bureaucratic life but also its very raison d'etre. Instead of fearing bureaucratic discretion,
these thinkers welcomed it because they perceived the managers and employees who
exercised it to be 'experts' whose professionalism simultaneously limited the scope of
their power, prevented personal domination, and made possible the creativity and
flexibility necessary to the effectiveness of the bureaucratic form.”)

51
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Instead, regulators and politicians invoke science as a justification for politics.
Bureaucrats use science to avoid accountability for politics; scientists, it is
complained, are often lobbyists in disguise. “Studies of scientific advising leave
in tatters the notion that it is possible, in practice, to restrict the advisory process
to technical issues or that the subjective values of scientists are irrelevant to
decision making.”52 Agencies practice politics and manipulate science to suit
ideological ends. Wendy Wagner famously writes of the “science charade”53 and
Schoenbrod talks of “co-opting the legitimacy of science.”54 He goes on to give
numerous examples to illustrate what he views as the fallacy of scientific
impartiality; or, more accurately, the way agency politics are invoked to
manipulate and distort legitimate scientific research, leading to decisions based
on bad information. "[T]he EPA hired the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
to study whether lead pollution is harmful. The NAS is the citadel of science in
Washington, but science in Washington is sometimes politics by other means.
The NAS appointed a panel slanted in favor of the lead-additive makers and
their allies in the petroleum and lead industries. According to Science magazine,
the

panel

included

four

industry

employees,

but

'no

identifiable

'environmentalist'...as a counterpoise to industry's weight.'”55 Schoenbrod, like
others, points out that we have not been able to come to terms about appropriate

52

SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS, 230 (1990).

Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
34453 (1995); Wendy Wagner, Science In The Regulatory Process: The "Bad Science" Fiction:
Reclaiming The Debate Over The Role Of Science In Public Health And Environmental
Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (2003);
53

54

DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 221 (2005).

55

DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 30 (2005).
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levels of lead for children, for example. We cannot reliably conclude that certain
toxins released into our water are, in fact, dangerous.
Where there is no scientific consensus, we cannot legitimately base
decisions on science and must avoid biased and prejudicial information. But it is
not just a question of scientific certainty.56 Even if science were to be a reliable
determinant, there is another critique – a variation on the theme about
democratic legitimacy – that argues against making decisions on the basis of
science rather than on the basis of values. Even where we can identify health and
safety risks with some precision, the democratic mandate demands that decisionmaking in the public interest must be driven by other factors as well. We have to
consider “facts on the ground”57 and how they are impacted, what their concerns
are and what solutions they might propose.

Schoenbrod tells the story of the

small-scale cider farmers in upstate New York and New England and how they
devised a better and less expensive plan to protect the public than the stringent
rules on pasteurization called for by the FDA. Science, which might dictate safe
levels of bacteria, does not solve the problem of how to get to those safe levels.
Only localized decision making with the benefit of that knowledge and
experience, suggests Schoenbrod, can solve the problem.

Matthew Sag and Kurt Rodhe, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent Reform 6 (draft
dated Aug 12, 2006), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc (quoting STEPHEN
TOULMIN, RETURN TO REASON 204-214 (2001)). “[A] demand for ‘conclusive proof’ of a
proposition may itself simply reflect a preoccupation with a narrow mathematical form
of reasoning modeled on the scientific method, and a futile quest for certainty where
certainty is not possible.”).
56

57

DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 13 (2005).

25

Scientific Expertise, Open Review and Patent Reform

It would be simplistic to suggest that agencies are not relying on science.
They cannot do their work without it. But the belief and trust in science, the
willingness to permit scientific input and review before a decision is made, are
on the decline. Over time, we have shifted toward a vision of agencies as
managing social interests and weighing values rather than one of agencies
managing expertise58

This acknowledges the political pressures of governance

even within the agency. While agencies have always had to balance interests and
rely on expert, scientific information, the prevailing legal realist view is that
agencies are subject to political pressure and should avoid the use of outside
expertise.
While in 1972, there were 1400 Federal Advisory Committees by 1982,
there were 878. By 1992 the number increased to 1141 but only 33% of those
were established on the basis of agency authority (as opposed to legislative
mandate) and in 1998 the number once again dropped to 892 with 28% chartered
under agency authority.59

Of course, these numbers alone do not convey the

entire picture of who served on these committees, whether they were from
academic or industry science and what account, if any, was taken of their work.
Federal Advisory Committees are, in any case, coming under fire for beign

See Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359,
360 (1972) ("The 'public interest' . . . is not a monolith," writes Gellhorn. "It involves a
balance of many interests and the presentation of otherwise unrepresented views should
be viewed as a potential aid rather than a hindrance to agency operations.").
58

FACA Database available at
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?programId=9137&channelId=13170&ooid=9673&contentId=14451&pageTypeId=8203&contentType=GSA_BASIC&pro
gramPage=%2Fep%2Fprogram%2FgsaBasic.jsp&P=MC.

59
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essentially ideological rather than scientific mouthpieces.60 But the declining
numbers and the Executive Order61 in 1993 to cut Federal Advisory Committees
for being wasteful and ineffectual, give some indication. Agencies are taking
scientific research in-house and, whether for improper reasons of political
ideology or for appropriate reasons of avoiding political manipulation, they take
less account of science and have become less transparent about the information
used in their decision making.
This shift away from science is accelerated by the fact that courts are not
required and, in fact, will not review agency decisions based on a supposed lack
of adequate scientific information.

62

As the Supreme Court held in Vermont

Yankee, an agency may only be reviewed for failing to follow a statutory mandate
not based on the quality of the information as such.

63

While there have been

cases criticizing an agency’s use of science,64 on the whole, courts defer to agency
determinations about science.65 “[M]any panels defer excessively to any agency

60

See Defending Science, Federal Advisory Committees at
http://www.defendingscience.org/public_health_regulations/Federal-AdvisoryCommittees.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees, Exec. Order 12838, 58
Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb 10, 1993), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61534.

61

62

see Stephen Merrill, Forward, 66 L. & Contemp Problems 2 (2003).

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
435 U.S. 519; 98 S.Ct. 1197; 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978).

63

Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 19 (2003).
64

See, e.g. Sigma-Tau Pharma v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 2002) (the “broad
deference” due the agency “is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation
concerns 'a complex and highly technical regulatory program,' in which the identification
and classification of relevant 'criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail
the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.'”) Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512
U.S. at 512 (quoting Pauley v. Beth Energy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697, 115 L. Ed. 2d

65
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action that contains a scientific component. In some instances courts effectively
avoid judicial review entirely, preferring instead to defer blindly to an agency's
decision regardless of its sometimes even obvious flaws. Such judicial passivity
does not enhance democratic accountability. Chevron66 and Daubert67 teach that
courts need not -- and must not -- venture into the merits of competing or
complex scientific findings.”

68

Judicial deference to decisions based on science

only produce a greater incentive for agencies to legitimize their decisions on the
basis of what is often junk science69 but gives the appearance of credibility.
While science is losing the battle, because the result is declining quality of
decision making, it is the public that ultimately loses the war.

Information Deficit and Patent Quality

604, 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991)); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984) (sometimes the legislative delegation to an
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency. … “in these cases the Administrator's
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests
and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
reconciling conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but
did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body
consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that
those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the
question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side
of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme
devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things
occurred.)
66

Chevron U. S. A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

67

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 28 (2003).
68

69

PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 1-6 (1991).
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There was enough of a sense that agencies are making decisions without
the benefit of the best or the right scientific information that Congress felt
compelled to pass the Information Quality Act in 2001 (IQA).70

Its goal (in

theory if not in practice) is to improve government policymaking by changing
the information upon which the government can rely to make decisions. It is
intended to improve quality and, at the same time, increase public participation
and improve information disclosure by agencies. Regardless of whether the law
has any salutary effect (and administrative law scholar Steven Johnson
vehemently argues that it does not), there is a prevailing information deficit
resulting from the war on science. Nowhere is that more the case and nowhere
are the effects more obvious than in the case of patents and patent examination
practice.
A consensus is emerging that there is a crisis of “patent quality.” Because
of a lack of access to adequate information and to the knowledge of how to apply
it most effectively, the USPTO is granting undeserving applications. Bureaucrats
are supposed to possess “the knowledge that comes from specialized
experience.”71 Yet the reality is that the supposedly expert bureaucrat – in this
case fifty-five percent of patent examiners – has been at the USPTO for fewer

Information Quality Act, 35 USC § 3516; Pub. L. No. 106-554, para 515, 114 Stat. 2763A153-154 (Dec. 21, 2000). Implemented by the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information
Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002), reissued with corrections, 67 Fed. Reg.
8452 (Feb. 22, 2002).

70

Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
1669. 1678 (1975).

71
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than two years.72 It is not surprising given the fact that they are getting paid
approximately $55,000 and a first-year associate in a Manhattan law firm earns a
base salary of $125,000. In addition to being underpaid, they are also
overworked.73 An examiner has an average of 18-20 hours to do the initial review
of an application.74 Arguably, we have returned to the registration regime we
abandoned in 1836.

75

Patent bureaucrats enjoy a great deal more discretion than their
counterparts at other agencies. They have responsibility for granting a twentyyear monopoly with limited supervision, oversight or review when a first or
second year civil servant at another agency would be drafting memos. The wideranging discretion of agency officials would not be such a problem, Adam Jaffe
and Josh Lerner point out in Innovation and Its Discontents, were it not for the fact
that courts are increasingly likely to find in favor of patent holders.76
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The

ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 136 (2004).

Gregory Aharonian, A Few Patent Examiners Complain About Patent Quality, PATNEWS,
(January 28, 1999).
73

74 H.R. REP NO. GAO-05-720 (June 15, 2005). The USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring
Examiners, but Challenges to Retention Remain (depending on the type of patent and the
skill level of the examiner, each examiner is expected to process an average of 87
applications per year at a rate of 19 hours per application. United States Government
Accountability Office Intellectual Property The USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring
Examiners, but Challenges to Retention Remain). See also, Brenda Sandburg, Speed Over
Substance?, INTELL. PROP. MAGAZINE (March 1999).

J. Giles and S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement 14 FED. CIR. B.J.163,
165 (2005) (We had an examination regime from 1790 to 1793 and then adopted a
registration system from 1793 to 1836 but the outcry was so great that we had to return to
examination and created the modern Patent Office to handle the work.).
75

James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On
Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (“There is also direct evidence that
the Federal Circuit has changed patent validity and patent scope. The research must be
used cautiously though, because it does not control for the selection effect. Allison and
76
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Supreme Court rarely hears patent-related certiorari petitions77 (2006 being a
notable exception).78
Patents are consequently both stronger, easier to get and more likely to be
upheld without any concomitant guarantee of their quality. This has led to a
system that sometimes rewards invention at the expense of innovation. In other
words, the inventor may receive the boon of the patent monopoly but the “useful
arts,” that the Constitution aims to advance are not promoted. Instead, the
current system has generated tremendous uncertainty with regard to the role
patents play in the marketplace. Whether the cause or the effect, there are

Lemley find the patent validity rate has increased since the creation of the Federal
Circuit. Lunney finds that the Federal Circuit is less likely to find infringement than
predecessor courts and thus has narrowed patent scope. Wagner and Petherbridge find
Federal Circuit claim interpretation decisions are growing more predictable.”); see also
Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, U Ill. L. & Econ. Research
Paper (2005) (“[S]ignificant percentage of cases (about 8-9%) are resolved on the merits
through summary judgment. Consequently, summary judgments are important in patent
cases for determining patent validity and infringement, and the summary judgments
related to patent validity occur earlier in the litigation compared to summary judgments
related to patent infringement. This result is somewhat encouraging given the important
role played by the courts in revoking patent rights improvidently granted at the outset
by the PTO. Nevertheless, despite the fact that such rulings occur early in the
proceedings compared to patent trials, we should still be concerned about the huge
transaction costs associated with patent litigation because summary judgments in
general, and summary judgment based on invalidity in particular, are expensive
compared to summary judgments granted on other grounds.”), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=808347.
Mark D. Janis, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: Patent Law in the Age of
the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 387 (2001) (The Supreme Court has
rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court
of patents.).

77

See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 126 S. Ct. 1565 (2006); Illinois Tool
Works, Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); LabCorp v. Metabolite Labs., Inc.,
126 S. Ct. 2921, 165 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2006)(dismissing writ of cert.); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006); KSR Intn’t v. Teleflex, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
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double the number of patent applications today and the backlog has risen to over
1 million.
In practice, the examiner has too little information or too little knowledge
of how to apply available information in order to render a decision.

The

examiner searches an internal Patent Office database containing U.S. and foreign
patent applications and certain journals in an effort to find prior art. While some
examiners might use Google to look up information online, the use of Internet
research is severely restricted for security reasons.

In more than half the

technology centers79 (formerly known as examining groups) at the USPTO,
Internet research is forbidden.80 He is limited to those sources he can find on his
own from the office.
This gives rise to a “goldilocks” problem: too little information, too much
information and none of it just right.81 In searching for prior art, know-how that

For a list of the USPTO Technology Centers, see
http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm.

79

U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) 904.02(c) (8th ed. 2004) (“When the Internet is used to
search, browse, or retrieve information relating to a patent application which has not
been published, other than a reissue application or reexamination proceeding, Patent
Organization users MUST restrict search queries to the general state of the art unless the
Office has established a secure link over the Internet with a specific vendor to maintain
the confidentiality of the unpublished patent application. Non-secure Internet search,
browse, or retrieval activities that could disclose proprietary information directed to a
specific application which has not been published, other than a reissue application or
reexamination proceeding, are NOT permitted. This policy also applies to use of the
Internet as a communications medium for connecting to commercial database
providers.”). See also Internet Usage Policy, 64 F.R. 33056, Art. 4 (June 21, 1999) (“If
security and confidentiality cannot be attained for a specific use, transaction, or activity,
then that specific use, transaction, or activity shall NOT be undertaken/conducted.”)
80

See also, Jay Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERK. TECH. L.J.
763, 763 and 767 (2002) (“It is widely recognized that the Patent Office grants overlybroad patents because it has deficient knowledge of the relevant prior art, especially in
high technology areas with significant nonpatent prior art.”).

81
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predates the invention that might pre-empt it and invalidate the patent’s claims,
such as patents or journal articles, websites or other disclosures that might
suggest that the invention is not new, the examiner sometimes turns up nothing.
While the patent may sound like something familiar that’s come before, often she
cannot find other written material that actually teaches the claims of the patent.
Alternatively, she is so inundated with related prior art but has trouble in the
time allotted to review an application, winnow the material and find art that is
relevant and useful for the examination process.82 Even if she can find art that is
pertinent, she still may have trouble knowing from the perspective of one
practicing in that area if the patent is an obvious or non-obvious inventive leap
over the combined prior art references.
A patent examiner, especially those who may not use the Internet, must
find their information from two computers systems in place at the United States
Patent Office: `EAST' (Examiner's Automated Search Tool) and `WEST' (WebBased Examiner Search Tool). In addition, there is a database of foreign patent
filing.

These databases provide access to prior U.S. patents, foreign patent

abstracts, certain pending U.S. applications, and additional proprietary database
libraries.

Examiners can conduct full-text searching of published applications

since 2001 and patents granted since 1970 as well as access optically-scanned
copies of patents since 1920.83

Patent applications, of course, also contain

Eli Kintisch, US Patent Policy: USPTO Wants to Tap Experts to Help Examiners, SCIENCE,
19 May 2006 at 982, available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/312/5776/982b.
82

U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) 902.03(e) (8th ed. 2004) (“The automated search tools on
examiners' desktop computers include the Examiner's Automated Search Tool (EAST),
83

33

Scientific Expertise, Open Review and Patent Reform

references to prior art. Contrary to popular assumption, they do not contain
access to the corpus of scientific knowledge.84
In Sampat’s recent study85 of 502,687 utility patents, he finds that
examiners have a comparative disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art
or foreign patents.86 Interestingly, while patent examiners account for 41% of the
citations to previous U.S. patents, they account for only 10% of references to nonpatent prior art. “If an applicant does not search for prior art and thereby does
not report a piece of relevant prior art on his/her information disclosure
statement, the examiner is less likely to discover it if it is codified in the nonpatent literature or a foreign patent than if it is codified in a U.S. patent, since
examiner capabilities for searching for U.S. patents exceed their capabilities for
searching other sources of prior art.”87
Particularly in cutting-edge areas of innovation where information may
not be available in patent applications, examiners are not digging up what they
need. Applicants are not required to provide it.88 “Because the applicant need

the Web-Based Examiner Search Tool (WEST), and the Foreign Patent Access System
(FPAS).”).
Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515, 516
(2003) (calling for the creation of open, global databases and the linking of local patent
databases into a globally distributed database to facilitate global searching).
84

85Bhaven

Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis (2006), available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf.
Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (2006), available
at http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf.

86

Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 13 (2006),
available at
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf.

87

The applicant is required to disclose any information which is material to the
prosecution of the patent. Oath or Declaration, 37 CFR 1.63(b)(3) (2004). According to
Chisum, “Traditionally, standard practice in the Patent and Trademark Office did not

88
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only provide material information of which he or she is aware, and is not
required to search for any of this information, the informational burdens on the
examiner are clearly heavy—even before the examiner engages in the heavy
lifting of interpreting the prior art.”89 Third-party comment, while provided for
in the statute,90 must be made within a two-month window for a fee and without
commentary and is, therefore, rarely invoked.
Under current law, patent examiners may consult databases but they may
not consult the public when searching for prior art.91 The examiner is expected to
be scientifically adept enough to discover the prior art on her own. However,

require the applicant to disclose or cite items in the prior art believed to be relevant to the
patentability of claims in the application. The examiner searched the prior art and cited
relevant items in reasons given for rejection of claims. Furthermore, an applicant and his
or her patent attorney were under no duty to conduct a search of the prior art.” Chisum
on Patents, 6-19 Chisum on Patents § 19.03 (b) (2006). Sometimes applicants file no prior
art at all. See, e.g. Tim Palmer, Applicants not Citing Any Prior Art: Scary, Patent
Chronicles (March 23, 2005, 3:30 pm), available at
http://www.patentchronicles.com/archives/20050323/applicants-not-citing-anyartscary/ (The USPTO has proposed a rule change to “encourage patent applicants to
provide the USPTO the most relevant information related to their inventions in the early
stages of the review process. As a result, patent applications could be processed in a
more streamlined and effective manner.”). Changes To Information Disclosure Statement
Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38808 (10 July 2006).
89

Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 183 (2006).

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2004). That has been interpreted to mean that only prior
art without commentary can be submitted. Hence the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure Rule 1134.01 implementing the Code of Federal Regulations, 37 CFR 1.99,
provides that third parties may submit prior art without commentary in response to a
published but not-yet-granted application. Within two months of publication, someone
may submit no more than 10 patents and publications. They may not highlight or mark
up the materials submitted. They must pay $180 for the privilege of submitting prior art.
The patent examiner may not respond to the third party (except to process the fee).

90

U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) § 1.291(d) (8th ed. 2004) Protests by the Public against
Pending Applications. A member of the public filing a protest in an application under
this section will not receive any communication from the Office relating to the protest,
other than the return of a self-addressed postcard which the member of the public may
include with the protest in order to receive an acknowledgement by the Office that the
protest has been received.
91
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third parties may, to a limited extent, submit prior art after the publication and
before the issuance of a patent. While patent examination is confidential, nonprovisional utility applications are published eighteen months after the filing
date.92
While the patent examination process is unique, it mimics in many
important respects the way agencies make decisions, including ones such as
these that have a longstanding impact on the economy and on scientific
innovation. The examiner is forced to enact a 20-year grant of monopoly rights
on the basis of an internal database and without the benefit of outside
information. Whether it’s horror stories about the EPA and the Clean Air Act or
the Patent Office and the Peanut Butter and Jelly Sandwich Patent,93 the
pervasive information deficit problem that has resulted from an absence of
adequate scientific expertise in policymaking is causing problems.

Part III: Why Traditional Peer Review is Not the Solution

The traditional solution proposed to remedy the information deficit and
information quality problem in administrative agencies is peer review. Peer
review provides a mechanism for oversight and quality control of agency science
and is a practice in widespread use in government, academia and industry.
“Refereeing procedures,” such as peer review, writes Sheila Jasanoff, “have come

92 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES (8th ed. 2005), 1120, 37 C.F.R. § 1.211
(2006). In 2005, 291,221 applications were published. USPTO PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/2005annualreport.pdf.
93

ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 25ff. (2005).
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to be regarded as the most effective method of validating science in two quite
different spheres of professional activity: prepublication review of journal
articles and screening of applications by federal research sponsoring agencies.
There is thus an appealing logic to the syllogism that links peer review to “good
science” in the regulatory process.”94 As we shall discuss, however, the logic is
fallacious. Traditional peer review suffers from considerable problems that make
it ill-suited to remedying the information deficit.
Through peer review, researchers allow other experts to examine, criticize
and improve their work.95 This enhances the quality of science and innovation
while maximizing the efficient use of the scarce resource of time.

Peer review

allows colleagues to evaluate each other and in so doing to “certify the
correctness of procedures, establish the plausibility of results, and allocate
resources."96

94

SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS, 61 (1990).

See Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making, Carnegie Commission, New York
75 (1993). See, e.g. DeploymentLink, Peer Review Essential for Scientific Advances (Sept. 1,
2001), available at http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/news/sep01/news_90401_001.shtml
(“Scientists say peer review is a critical quality control principle in the planning, design,
conduct and interpretation of scientific research. Peer review of research reflects
scientists' commitment to careful and objective pursuit of knowledge. Through peer
review, researchers allow other experts to examine, criticize and improve their work.”)
95

DARRYL J. CHUBIN, EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S.
SCIENCE POLICY 2 (1990).
96
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Peer review97 is in common use in government.98 The National Science
Foundation and the National Institutes of Health both use peer reviewers to
determine if research is novel and represents a contribution to its field.99 The
National Science Foundation currently relies on a network of over 50,000
reviewers.100 The National Institutes of Health relies on outside review groups
and advisory councils from the scientific community to review over 70% of its
applications.101 The Environmental Protection Agency grant selection process

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: COMPLIANCE WITH THE
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT AND LOBBYING RESTRICTIONS, GAO/GGD/OGC-0018 (Dec. 30 1999); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE PEER REVIEW: COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PRIVACY ACT AND FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, GAO/GGD-91-48 (Apr. 17 1991);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW: EPA NEEDS IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES
AND ADDITIONAL CONTROLS, GAO/IRCED-94-98 (Feb. 22 1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD HELP AGENCIES
BETTER ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE, GAO-04-328, (Apr. 1 2004); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE
AGENCIES VARY, GAO/RCED-99-99 (Mar. 1 1999); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER
REVIEW: REFORM NEEDED TO ENSURE FAIRNESS IN FEDERAL AGENCY GRANT SELECTION,
GAO/PEMD-94-1 (Jun. 24 1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEES: GSA'S MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND GAO COMMENTS LEGISLATIVE
AMENDMENTS, GAO/T-GGD-890 1 (Oct. 5 1998); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
UNIVERSITY FUNDING: INFORMATION ON THE ROLE OF PEER REVIEW AT NSF AND NIH,
GAO/WED-87-87FS (Mar. 26, 1987); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ACT: GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION'S MANAGEMENT ADVISORY
ACTIVITIES, GAO/GGB89-10 (Oct. 5 1988).
97

See Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory
Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1045 (2000). See also, Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious
Peer Review Procedures, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10064 (2004).
98

Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing The Right Dose Of Peer Review For the Endangered Species Act, 83
NEB. L. REV. (2004) (discussing scientific peer review and arguing against excessive
reliance on peer review).
99

National Science Foundation, How We Work (Jul 15, 2005) at
http://www.nsf.gov/about/how.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). See also Thomas O.
McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 BERK. TECH. L.J.
1, 7 (1994).

100

See National Institutes of Heath, Center for Scientific Review, at
http://cms.csr.nih.gov/AboutCSR/Welcome+to+CSR (last updated Aug. 4, 2005).

101
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relies heavily upon “Science Review Panels” which are peer review groups
chosen and managed by an outside scientist.102
Typically, a professional elite103 conducts the peer review that opines on
work product within the discipline. Governmental peer review is not as far
ranging as in academia. Industry and academic peer reviewers are used by
agencies to vet grant proposals and conduct site visits to university labs.

104

Agencies use peer review, according to the General Accounting Office to: “(1)
assess the merit of competitive and noncompetitive research proposals, (2)
determine whether to continue or renew research projects, (3) evaluate the
results of the research prior to the publication of those results, (4) establish
annual budget priorities for research programs, and (5) evaluate program and
scientist performance. All of the agencies who use peer review do so to assess
competitive research proposals for funding (e.g. NIH and NSF use peer review to
award grants for scientific research) having nothing to do with science in
policymaking. The methods for conducting peer reviews vary among and within
Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9
BERK. TECH. L.J. 1, 26 (1994).

102

“Individual agencies define peer review somewhat differently; however, all of the
agencies’ definitions or descriptions of peer review contained the fundamental concept of
a review of technical or scientific merit by individuals with sufficient technical
competence and no unresolved conflict of interest. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER
REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY, GAO/RCED 99-99 (March 1999),
available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-99.
103

For example, NSF uses 58,000 peer reviewers each year to study 40,000 proposals and
submit 250,000 separate evaluations. See NAT’L. SCI. FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD ON THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION’S MERIT REVIEW
SYSTEM (Sep. 30, 2005), NSB-05-119, available at
www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2005/0930/merit_review.pdf. See also How We Work,
http://www.nsf.gov.about/how/jsp (last updated July 15, 2005). See also
STRENGTHENING PEER REVIEW IN FEDERAL AGENCIES THAT SUPPORT EDUCATION RESEARCH,
CENTER FOR EDUCATION (National Academies Press, 2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Peer
Review In Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (1994).
104
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the agencies. For example, the agencies select peer reviewers from academia,
private industry, and government and obtain review comments, not only in
person during site visits, but by mail, in workshops or a combination of
methods.105 Scientific peer reviewers, however, do not decide policy and, as a
general matter, they do not set budget priorities or allocate resources (except as
between research proposals). EPA peer reviewers, for example, oversee the
scientific research conducted by outside groups for the agency under its Office of
Research and Development’s $40 million dollar research budget.

106

necessarily have a voice in decision making.107

They do not

In no instance is an agency

accountable to the scientific community.108
While lawmaking is not under the purview of science, Congress has tried
to increase the use of peer review (even as it mandates that agencies reduce the
number of Federal Advisory Committees) in agencies to improve the quality of
information used and disseminated by them. The Information Quality Act (IQA)
legislates that data will be of sufficient quality under the Act and therefore that
government will be able to make decisions based on that information if,
according to OMB’s interpretive guidelines of the IQA, it is subjected to

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES
VARY, GAO/RCED 99-99 (March 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgibin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-99.
105

About EPA, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm (last updated Aug. 24,
2005).

106

Stephen Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law: Reforming the Information Quality Act,
58 ADMIN LAW REV. 37 (2006); see also Michelle V. Lacko, The Data Quality Act: Prologue
To A Farce Or A Tragedy?, 3 EMORY L.J. 305 (2004).
107

E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45,
58 (2003) (It has become a canon of institutional faith at EPA that scientists should just
stick to the facts and not make policy recommendations.).

108
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independent peer review.109

In its Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer

Review, OMB set forth detailed requirements for peer review that focused on
“timing of peer reviews, selection of reviewers, transparency of review, and
opportunities for public participation.”110 The OMB Guidelines mandate that
agencies set up peer review processes and involve the public in them.
This is not a surprising approach since agencies have longstanding
experience with peer review practices,

111

which are, of course, in widespread use

in the scientific community. “It is an integral practice to the development of
quality research in the private and public sectors, in industry and in education
because the process of peer review allows even a large group of scientists,
regardless of geographic proximity, to collaborate on the evaluation of
innovation.”112 As Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor, explains, such
regularized review processes are well-suited to the workings of administrative
agencies: “[T]he postwar intellectual and political project in policymaking
became the reconciliation of the practical necessity of broad administrative
discretion with this emerging pluralist norm.

The "solution" was found in the

idea of administrative process. Henceforth, public administrators would become
managers of neutral processes designed to discover "optimal" public policies.

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3,
2002), reissued with corrections, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002).

109

Stephen Johnson, Reforming the Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 60 (2005)
(quoting Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2671 (Jan
14, 2005)).

110

Mohammed Kashef, Scientific Peer Review In The Public Sector (last modified Dec. 5,
2005), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/peerreview_dec05.pdf.

111

Mohammed Kashef, Scientific Peer Review In The Public Sector (last modified Dec. 5,
2005), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/peerreview_dec05.pdf.
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The hallmark of the administrator became procedural expertise in using a set of
techniques applicable to all sorts of public problems rather than substantive
expertise in solving particular kinds.”113 As such, peer review represents a fairly
conservative means to attack the information quality problem and would seem,
at first glance, to provide the much needed oversight and accountability.
In fact, peer review is fraught with problems that undermine its
credibility.

114

Were it not for the fact that it can be significantly improved upon, it

might be caviling to attack governmental peer review, though, leading scientific
organizations already have.115 First, let us identify the shortcomings in order to
demonstrate the argument that open review presents the better alternative.

Robert Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94
YALE L.J. 1617, 1619 (1985).

113

114 SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS (1990);
Wendy Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67ff. (2003)
(criticizing how “good science” reforms attempt to promote greater peer review); Sidney
A. Shapiro, Peer Review and the Politicization of Government Science, in RESCUING SCIENCE
FROM POLITICS, (Wendy Wagner, Rena Steinzor, eds., 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=910915.

See OMB Watch, Peer Review News, available at
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/archive/232 (archive of objections to OMB peer
review guidelines). See also Defending Science, OMB’s Peer Review Guidelines, at
http://www.defendingscience.org/public_health_regulations/peer_review_guidelines.c
fm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). See also Chris Mooney, The Politics of Peer Review, in
Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (Jan. 8, 2004),
available at http://www.csicop.org/doubtandabout/peerreview/ (“Given all this, you
might expect that a recent White House Office of Management and Budget proposal to
expand the use of peer review in the evaluation of scientific research conducted by
federal agencies would find a warm welcome from scientists. You'd be dead wrong.
Scientific heavyweights like the American Public Health Association, the Association of
American Medical Colleges, and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental
Biology have issued scathing critiques of the proposal (the latter two jointly), as have a
range of other organizations and experts. The hallowed American Association for the
Advancement of Science--which publishes the preeminent peer reviewed journal Science-also has worries about the idea. A group of Democratic members of Congress even
dubbed it a "wolf in sheep's clothing.").
115
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The problems of traditional peer review stem from the fact that it is an
elite, closed process and therefore subject to manipulation.

Not necessarily

closed in the sense of secretive,116 but in the sense that agency peer review groups
are empanelled not self-selected.

It is therefore possible to stack the deck with

ideologues and to create peer review mechanisms that are fraught, not with
deliberative disagreement, but unproductive conflict. Because the membership
of these groups is closed, the community itself has no say over who participates.
Typically, only certain kinds of industry and academic experts will be invited.
Those limitations need not be based on politics – though a political litmus test is
frequently imposed

117

– but may, however, be based on status and thereby shut

out otherwise qualified participants with meaningful contributions.
There is no single set of procedures that define peer review. Its practice
varies widely across agencies.

Hence there are no required mechanisms to

ensure transparency in the work of agency peer reviewers. The mere fact that
these panels share the name “peer review” with that of rigorous academic
counterparts does not ensure the quality of their work (nor that of academic peer
review). There are no assurances that what they do is based on good science
rather than political prejudice. GAO has found that "further improvements are
needed to expand the scope of peer reviews [at EPA] and make them more

The purpose of the Federal Advisory Committee Act is to ensure that advice rendered
by advisory committees is open and accessible. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L.
92-463, 5 U.S.C., App 2 6(c) (2) (2006).

116

To serve on the NIH Drug Abuse panel, candidates were asked if they had voted for
President Bush. See William R. Miller, Litmus Test for Appointees at the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/nihdrug-abuse-panel.html (last updated Aug 10, 2005).
117
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independent," and that the implementation of EPA's peer-review policy has been
"uneven."118
Peer review is also time-consuming to organize119 and to run.120 Because
the group has to be selected, vetted and approved and fights can arise over
membership, it is a difficult process. Conflicts of interest have to be identified
and sorted out. Participants have to be convinced to join. Not only does the
composition of the group need to be selected and defended, but the scope of its
work can be contested. Hence, setting up peer review panels requires boundary
setting and policing and the defense of those boundaries.
It is, perhaps, in part because of the work that must go into maintaining a
peer review system that review generally happens late – too late in the process to
have a maximum impact on regulatory decision making. The same complaint is
frequently leveled against citizen participation practices more generally.
Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, n.24 (2003) ([The] GAO has "identified several weaknesses in EPA's
science programs over the years, including (1) the uneven implementation of peer review
procedures for EPA's scientific and technical products, (2) gaps in scientific data, and (3)
the lack of performance goals and measures that show the environmental results of EPA's
science activities.") (quoting U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE
AND RESULTS ACT: INFORMATION ON SCIENCE ISSUES IN EPA’S PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 1999 AND PERFORMANCE PLANS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001, Pub. No.
00-270 ,(2000)).
118

Sidney Shapiro, Data Quality: The Data Quality Appropriations Rider: New Procedures and
Information Disclosure , Center for Progressive Reform at
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm (last visited
August 14, 2006) (“While ensuring high-quality information is a worthy goal, procedural
requirements have an important side effect – they slow down the government’s capacity
to act and, if they are sufficiently burdensome, they can bring government to a standstill.
As a result, the benefits of imposing additional procedures have to be balanced against
the consequences to the public of delaying agency action.”).

119

120Megan

Sever, Government Peer Review, GEOTIMES (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.agiweb.org/geotimes/nov03/NN_peerrev.html (“Opponents, however,
warn that the standards could paralyze new regulations, especially on issues such as
global warming, or air or water pollution, where the risks and benefits are complex,
politically charged and potentially costly.”)
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Agencies ask for public comment once a rule is already written, often allotting
the public a short window in which to provide feedback and leaving little room
for meaningful change.121 As Raul and Dwyer comment: “[I]n many cases, endof-the-line review cannot repair mistakes or omissions made early in the
regulatory development process or fill data gaps. Back-end inspection may be
able to identify scientific uncertainties, but rarely can it reduce them. The benefits
of regulatory science quality control must also be balanced against the potential
for peer reviewers to intrude on the policy domain. If determining whether the
data and analysis are adequate for regulatory decision making is the problem,
then peer review does not solve the problem. It shifts the problem from decision
makers to reviewers.”

122

But the closed process fits well with the culture and practice of agencies.
“By deferring to expertise and asserting it ourselves, we help create a world
organized around the pretense that some people, armed and limited by their
special knowledge, can be trusted to be in charge.”123 The peer review process
arguably shores up this self-proclaimed expertise by lending credibility to the
agency’s assertion of expert knowledge. Frug goes on to point out, quoting the
moral philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre, that “'Bureaucratic Man' can thrive only

The Administrative Procedure Act provides for a minimum window of 30 days of
public consultation. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006).

121

See Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 13 (2003).

122

Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1333
(1984).
123
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if all of us invent a fiction of expertise that assigns to the character of the 'broadgauged' leader a role that justifies our own powerlessness.”124

Part IV: The Open Review Alternative125
We need institutional processes by which to overcome the problems of
closed peer review and create more transparent mechanisms that bring scientific
expertise to bear earlier in the process. We have witnessed how the combination
of open technology and well-defined process has enabled Wikipedia to elicit the
wisdom of the crowd and led to the creation of an encyclopedia with over
1,000,000 entries of quality comparable to that of traditional encyclopedias with
centralized editors.126

New technology has enabled Amazon to create a

marketplace, not just for the sale of goods and services, but also for the
aggregation of expertise and recommendations about those goods and services.127
CNet offers a platform to broker expertise about electronics and technology. The
Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.1276, 1333
(1984).
124

For a complete description of the Peer to Patent proposal, please see Beth S. Noveck,
Peer to Patent, 20 HARV. J. L. TECH. ___ (2006); see also Nicholas Varchaver, Patent Review
Goes Wiki, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 18, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/08/21/8383639/ind
ex.htm?source=yahoo_quote.
125

See Wikipedia, at http://www.wikipedia.org (as of this writing, there are 1,312,000
entries). See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head To Head

126

Jimmy Wales' Wikipedia Comes Close To Britannica In Terms Of The Accuracy Of Its Science
Entries, A Nature Investigation Finds, NATURE (Dec. 14, 2005; updated March 28, 2006)
(revealing that study by Nature demonstrates that Wikipedia is about as inaccurate as
Encyclopedia Britannica).
See Shay David and Trevor Pinch, Six Degrees of Separation: The Use and Abuse of Online
Review and Recommendation Systems, FIRST MONDAY (March 2006) (describing strategies
and techniques of user reviews and recommendations on Amazon).

127
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Internet Movie Database, the largest repository of information about cinema, is
created by volunteers submitting data about films and movie stars.128 Public
Library of Science, the pioneering open access publisher of scientific journals, is
launching PLoS One, a distributed knowledge network to enable scholars of
biology and medicine to discuss published research literature.129 We are learning
as a result of these experiences with online collaboration that often “ordinary”
people possess extraordinary knowledge they are willing to share when it is easy
to do.130

This peer-production of content works well online.

131

By making

participation open and subject to self-selection, we can leverage, not only the
wisdom, but also the enthusiasm of the crowd.132 Experience with the tools now
available is undermining traditional assumptions about how expertise must be
organized and pointing the way toward open models of scientific review, not

Internet Movie Database, available at http://www.imdb.com. See also Internet Movie
Database entry on Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMDB (“The
IMDb website consists of the largest known single accumulation of data on individual
films (including complete cast and crew listings), television programs (including
complete cast and crew listings), direct-to-video product and videogames reaching back
to their respective beginnings, and worldwide in scope… Information is largely provided
by a cadre of volunteer contributors, with only 17 members of the staff dedicated to
monitoring the data received) (last updated Aug. 15, 2006).
128

129

http://www.plos.org/news/announce_plosone.html

Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52
DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 (2003) (stating that peer production is the collaborative process by
which individuals "contribute to a joint effort" to produce "information or culture").
130

See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing collaboration in the context of open source, and other peerreview projects).
131 131

JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF THE CROWD (2004) (demonstrating how groups of
people can be smarter and more effective at certain kinds of decisions than individuals).

132
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only to create encyclopedias or book reviews,133 but also – and this is the radical
proposal – to inform legal decision making.
First, we will outline how an open peer review process for patent
examination could work and then, we will discuss the advantages of such a
change for the way the agency operates. The goal is not to outline technical
details of the policy proposal but to illuminate the normative and practice
desirability of openness by reference to some of the key design features.134 If we
are to succeed in lobbying for a move away from peer review and toward open
review, we need to demonstrate exactly how it addresses the problems of a
closed system.
The proposed system for open review directly addresses the problems
with the current examination process, including the “goldilocks dilemma” by
enabling the community of practice to collaborate on finding prior art, evaluating
the application and transforming the “person skilled in the art” from a fictional

MediaCommons, a new endeavor from the Institute for the Future of the Book, will
involve communication studies scholars in real-time open peer review, see Kathleen
Fitzpatrick, Introducing MediaCommons
http://www.futureofthebook.org/blog/archives/2006/07/introducing_mediacommons
_or_ti.html (July 17, 2006).
133

There are existing examples of patent commentary websites, though these are not
linked to Patent Office decision making. See Prevalent.de Software Patents, available at
http://prevalent.de/index.pl?site=1&subsite=3&lang=en. See also CAMBIA Patent
Lens, which offers patent searching and will eventually offer annotation, available at
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html (“The Patent Lens
contains patent documents from the European and United States patent offices and filed
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) in a format that is fully integrated and
searchable. The Patent Lens also offers technology landscapes, which describe key areas
of plant biotechnology and the patent claims surrounding them. In addition you will
find patent tutorials, information on patent policies, and news and views in the world of
IP.”) See also PatentWiki, http://www.patentwiki.org.
134
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legal personage into a real group.135 This system augments review by the lone
examiner with assistance from experts in the relevant art area, revolutionizing
the way patents are examined and providing a model for expert participation in
regulatory decision making.136 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
has adopted the proposal as part of its Strategic Initiatives and will launch a pilot
of open review in 2007.

137

The European Patent Office (EPO) is considering

following suit. The project has captured the imagination of some of the world’s
largest and most active patent holders, who have agreed to let some of their own
patents be reviewed openly.

These include: IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Intel,

Hewlett-Packard and Red Hat.
It is illogical to have one person – with access to limited information –
determining originality138 and whether the inventor slept on his rights139 as well as

For related earlier proposals pertaining to patent bounties, see John R. Thomas,
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001) (arguing that awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed
against applicants, the Patent Office can restore order to the patent system and reduce its
social costs.); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERK. TECH L.J. 667 (2004). See also Michael Felton, A Call for Bounty
Hunters, in Patents and Property (March 2001), available at
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/i03/html/03patents.html.
135

ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 22 (2005) (“"Until
the process is changed so that other parties that know something about the technology
surrounding a given application have the opportunity and incentive to bring that
knowledge forward, there will be no cost-effective way to fix the problem of low quality
patents.").
136

See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm.
137

138

35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004) (novelty).

Egbert v. Lippmann. 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881) (“The invention, forming the springs of
corsets of two or more metallic plates, placed one upon another, and so connected as to
prevent them from sliding off each other laterally or edgewise, was completed and put to
use in 1855. The inventor slept on his rights for eleven years. Letters-patent were not
applied for till March, 1866.”).

139
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obviousness140 or even enablement141 when we can harness the collective
intelligence and experience of thousands. Many technological advances are not
described in commonly available academic publications or those sources to
which the patent examiner has easy access. It is also illogical to turn to a single
firm, as the Patent Office once suggested, to conduct this review when those with
the deepest experience in any given area of innovation and bring their expertise
to bear.142
The pilot will focus on creating an online system to assist with novelty
review by allowing for the submission of prior art. The novelty determination is
ideally-suited to peer review because it enunciates a clear goal, requires only
minimal participation to address and lends itself to self-selection on the basis of
expertise.143 Far better for me to designate what I am good at since I am in the
best position to know.144 While a patent examiner might have to search for prior
art for hours, an expert knows instantly whether an invention is reminiscent of
earlier work or avenues of research. Designed right, the software can make
participation for a network of scientific and innovation experts clear and easy.

140

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004) (non-obviousness).

141

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004) (enablement).

USPTO, The 21st Century Strategic Plan (2003) (To achieve greater examiner
productivity by reducing their prior art search responsibilities, the USPTO is looking at
market driven examination options.) at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/comp/proc/pctsearch/pctsearchhom.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).

142

143 See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 62 (2004) (“The key element of the
open source process, as an ideal type, is voluntary participation and voluntary selection
of tasks.”).

See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) (Calabresi discusses the notion that the entity in the best position to carry the
“burden” is the one that should.).
144
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As Eric Raymond, hacker “anthropologist” phrased it, with many
eyeballs “all bugs are shallow.”

Just as a community of open source

programmers is well-suited to spotting mistakes in code, the peer to patent
community is equipped to address whether an invention is novel or resembles
something seen before. A prior art novelty review is an opportunity to get more
public input into the patent system and introduce citizen consultation, the
common and required practice of every government agency,145 into the
intellectual property review process.146
Once an application is published to the Web (under current rules, this
happens at eighteen months,147 though an applicant can consent to earlier
publication),148 it can be pushed out to the relevant experts. Using RSS (really
simple syndication)149 those with an interest in a particular area of art, whether it

Administrative Procedure Act §1, 5 USCS § 553 (b) (1946) (General notice of proposed
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law.) See also, 5 USCS § 553 (c) (1946) (After notice required by this
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without
opportunity for oral presentation.). On the application of administrative law to the
patent system, see Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System can Learn from Administrative Law

145

USPTO, The 21st Century Strategic Plan (2003) (To achieve greater examiner
productivity by reducing their prior art search responsibilities, the USPTO is looking at
market driven examination options, including outsourcing prior art review to private
firms) at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/comp/proc/pctsearch/pctsearchhom.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
146

147

37 C.F.R. § 1.211 (2006).

148

37 C.F.R. § 1.219 (2006).

While the Patent Office does not offer syndication, a private website, Fresh Patents
does. See http://www.freshpatents.com (last visited October 19, 2005). See also
Introduction to RSS, (revised April 14, 2003) (Really Simple Syndication (RSS) is an XML
format designed for sharing headlines and other Web content. RSS defines an XML
grammar for sharing content. Each RSS text file contains both static information about a

149
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is class 482 Exercise Devices or class 438 Semiconductor Device Manufacturing,150
can receive notification of the name and abstract of any new inventions filed via
newsreader, email or mobile phone for initial review. This makes it simple, not
only to learn about published applications, but also to share that information
with others since it is the expert in the community of practice who will know
who and how to find the other experts with knowledge of a particular area of art.
Information visualization tools make it simpler to evaluate the volume of
information and the frequency of communication to facilitate participation.
Visualization aids will make it easier for a subscriber – whether it is an industry
or academic scientist, a graduate student or professor or a competitive inventor
and her lawyers – to see the quantity of applications historically published in
each class and sub-class in order to know how broadly to subscribe and avoid
being overwhelmed. One needs to know in advance that Class 514 Drug, BioAffecting and Body Treating Compositions, is the most populous class, and that
one ought to sign up for relevant sub-classes, or that Needle and Pin Making
received only 1 application last year.
The system will promote “lonely patents” by advertising undersubscribed patent classes and subclasses for review to the network of experts. It
might employ a collaborative filtering system akin to Amazon’s to suggest

website or weblog, plus dynamic information about new stories, all surrounded by
matching start and end tags) at
http://www.webreference.com/authoring/languages/xml/rss/intro/ (last visited Sept.
30, 2005). For more about the use of RSS in government, see http://www.rssgov.com
(last visited December 5, 2005).
The Patent Classification System can be found online arranged alphabetically, by
subject matter, by class number and by art unit. See, Patent Classification System,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/.
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patents to review (e.g. “people who submitted prior art for this patent also read
that patent.”). Experts will receive RSS or email notifications of patents for
which no prior art has yet been submitted. Reviewing one patent application
will generate a prompt: “Would you like to review another?” Again, if the
system is designed to optimize inputs and facilitate participation, it can reduce
the burden of reviewing a patent for novelty and commenting on prior art.

In addition, reviewers can “tag” or label applications, not only according
to the official classification taxonomy, but also by their own designations. This
kind of supplementary community self-tagging – or what is sometimes called a
“folks-onomy”151 – might make it easier to find applications of interest by
allowing experts to apply other labels to identify an invention in the terminology
that is common to his or her specialty. In other words, what the patent office
calls Exercise Devices, may commonly be known among physical therapists as
elliptical machines. What the Patent Office might refer to as semi-conductor
manufacture, the reviewer might also label “chip.” Such a folksonomy could
make labeling more granular and precise to speed up the process of selfassignment.152 We already have tagging and labeling software, most commonly

For more on folksonomies, see Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folksonomy
(last updated January 1, 2006). See also, Clay Shirky, Ontology is Overrated: Categories,
Links, and Tags, at http://www.shirky.com/writings/ontology_overrated.html (last
visited January 2, 2006).
151

“Zoo Bank” is creating just such a user-created taxonomy and classification system in
another arena. The technique and the technology could be used to classify inventions.
See Commentary: A Universal Register for Animal Names, 437 NATURE 477 (Sep. 22, 2005).
The Open Source Development Lab has launched the “Open Source Software as Prior
Art” project which aims to use tagging to make open source software more available to
patent examiners (“The goal is to reduce the number of poor quality patents that issue by

152
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known from photo-sharing services such as Flickr, that allows Internet users to
label content for easier retrieval, indexing and searching.153

Figure 1 – Open Review Pilot Process

Each application will reside on a web page where members of the
community of practice and interest can submit relevant prior art for a two-month

increasing accessibility to Open Source Software code and documentation that can be
used as prior art during the patent examination process. For the Open Source community
and many others, this means a reduction in the number of software patents that can be
used to threaten software developers and users, and a resulting increase in innovation.”),
available at http://developer.osdl.org/dev/priorart/.
153

See del.icio.us About Page, http://del.icio.us/doc/about (last visited Sept. 30. 2005).
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window after publication.154 Two months tracks the amount of time currently
available to members of the public wishing to submit prior art under CFR Rule
1.99155 (though this could just as well be three or four months).

Rule 1.99

provides that third parties can submit prior art within that two month window
and after paying a fee. To enable prior art peer review, as we are describing
here, the Patent Office, at least initially, has agreed to waive the filing fee of $180
to facilitate submission of art.
More significantly, two months creates a manageable window of time in
which to learn about and submit prior art without overwhelming the examiner
or the community with too much data to review. By delimiting the time for
submission of prior art, this could aid the examiner while drastically accelerating
the process of review from the average 2-4 years156 that the Patent Office
currently requires. By speeding up the review process, we also speed up the

There once existed a private service known as BountyQuest where inventors could
post an application and pay for third parties to submit prior art as a mechanism to
strengthen the quality of the application and find any prior art before the fact. See Sabra
Chartrand, Patents: Disproving Idea Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, October 23, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/technology/23PATE.html?ex=1143262800&en=
b13756e07e50dd38&ei=5070. See also John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in
the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (2001)
(proposing “that the Patent Office recruit members of the public to act as private patent
examiners. By awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed against applicants,
the Patent Office can restore order to the patent system and reduce its social costs.”)
154

155

37 CFR § 1.99 (2004).

See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm (Patent pendency now
averages more than 30 months and is expected to increase to 33.8 months (to issue) in
2011). In some areas, patent pendency is as high as 43.5 months. See
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060404_table4.html (2005).
156
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time for scientists to publish and publicly discuss innovation without the fear of
triggering a statutory bar.157
To submit prior art, a member of the community will log onto the system.
That logon need not be verified or even persistent. We want a small hurdle to
prevent junk from being submitted but not so high a hurdle as to create a
stumbling block to participation. At this stage of the game, the Patent Office
ought to want good prior art from anywhere and anyone who has it. It does not
matter if the party is interested or dispassionate. In fact, competitive interest will
be a driver and incentive to finding relevant prior art and participating in the
system.
The design of the system will enable the community to designate the
claims that are the crux of the invention. An application might recite a method
for sending and receiving electronic signals by means of a special hash
algorithm. The examiner does not need prior art pertaining to sending and
receiving, which are common steps. Rather, the Community’s attention should
be directed to finding prior art pertaining to the hash algorithm. If the
community identifies the central claims, there is a role to play, not only for
scientists, but also for lawyers as stewards of this process that mixes knowledge
of law with a knowledge of science.
Second, directions, instruction and even moderation by members of the
community are essential at every step in the process to create a strong ethos of
35 U.SC. §102 (b); 35 U.SC. §102 (e); (Section contains three different patent bars; the
“printed publication” bar, the “on-sale” bar, and the public use bar. See also, Midland
Flour Milling Co. v Bobbitt, 70 F.2d. 416 (1934) (holding prior publications rest upon
same ground as prior patents so far as anticipation is concerned and no valid patent can
be obtained if invention or device is disclosed in printed publication.)
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community and encourage the submission of useful and appropriate materials.
Wikipedia uses various mechanisms from written directions to open community
peer review and deletion to warning labels158 to ensure that entries posted are, in
fact, appropriate for an encyclopedia and adhere to standards of quality. The
Wikipedia community has evolved a clear and explicit sense of its mission and a
set of rules for writing encyclopedia entries. Similarly, a peer review system for
patents has to make very clear to participants what is expected of them. The
software itself will reject entries without references or sources or with a prior art
date that post-dates the invention. But the community itself can play a role by
voting good prior art up and irrelevant submissions down.
Third, the interface will be designed to require a submitter to identify the
claim to which a piece of prior art pertains.159 This will make participation easier
to review and more manageable for the examiner by allowing him to winnow
out prior art that relates to claims about which he needs no information. It also
makes it easier, especially for a patent with dozens of claims, for the examiner
and the community to assess the relevance of that submission. “This article
invalidates claim 3” is more useful than “this article invalidates this patent.”

Katherine Mangu-Ward, The Neutrality of this Article is Disputed, REASONONLINE (Aug
15, 2006), available at http://www.reason.com/links/links081506.shtml (“early every
Wikipedia user has occasionally come across a little tag at the top of an article: "Stop!" it
says, "The neutrality of this article is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page."
This little tag, I'm convinced, is the secret to Wikipedia's success. And I'm not alone.).
158

In the search report filed by an examiner performing a review under the PCT (Patent
Cooperation Treaty), the examiner cites prior art with the appropriate and relevant
passages noted, indicates the claim to which such prior art speaks and labels the
submission with one of 9 codes, including X, Y or A where X stands for novelty, Y stands
for obviousness and A stands for general state of the art. See International Search Report
Model Form at U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) §1844.01 (8th ed. 2004).
159
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Fourth, as on Slashdot where peers moderate each other’s postings in
order to enable readers to filter out quality comments as adjudged by the
community, members of the peer to patent community should rank the prior art
for relevance. The output at the end of the process will be a rank-ordered list of
prior art, identifying the top ten submissions as judged by the community.
Participation might require a minimum of three ratings. Incentives can be built
into the software, as Slashdot does,160 to encourage ongoing rating and ranking.
This has the effect of winnowing the submissions and making them more useful
and manageable to the examiner. The examiner will still have access to the full
list, which he can search, as he would any database, but, in this case, the database
will have been ordered not by machine but by people with relevant expertise.
Finally, earlier experience with peer review systems teaches that
participation will be enhanced through status and reward. Members of the
community who post useful information will receive “karma effects,”161 status
points for submitting prior art that is deemed relevant by the community.162

The Slashdot news site allows its members to rate postings in order to enable other
members to sort content based on member reviews. Good information, as determined by
that community and within the context of its own culture and values, rises to the top.
See Slashdot Comments and Moderation FAQ at http://slashdot.org/faq/commod.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).

160

For more on the role of status and reputation in fostering collective action, see Paul
Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMMUN. OF THE ACM 45, 46 (Dec. 2000); See also
Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, in 16 ADVANCES IN GROUP
PROCESSES (E.J. Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne & H.A. Walker eds., 1999); Paul Resnick,
Impersonal Sociotechnical Capital, ICT’s, and Collective Action Among Strangers, in
TRANSFORMING ENTERPRISE: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 399, (William H. Dutton, Brian Kahin, Ramon O’Callaghan & Andrew
Wyckoff, eds., 2004).
161

There are numerous existing social reputation software systems. Some of these
websites focus on social or dating relationships and offer rating systems whereby people
are “rated” based on who they know and who their friends are. In other words, the
wildly popular Friendster or Orkut provide a graphical map of my friendships. Cyworld,

162
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Status and reputation are essential to building the trust in the community
necessary for iterative interaction.163

It is also crucial for determining

qualifications for participation and for creating an incentive to ongoing
collaboration. The currently prevailing wisdom is that social reputation software
and other automated mechanisms for according status is the way to foster and
find such expertise. Reputation points on EBay, karma points on Slashdot,
honorifics in academic circles, all of these status mechanisms create an incentive
to participation and help to inculcate norms within the group. The peer patent
review system will also need to evolve mechanisms of conferring status on those
people who participate well and shoulder their burden.164 Reputation points
help to encourage active participation. It might come to be an important part, for
example, of being a graduate student in a field or being a junior scientist in a
corporation working in a particular area of art.

One gets rewarded for

another social networking service boasts a quarter of the population of Korea as its user
base. Linked In provides such a map for my business relationships. Epinions bills itself as
a “web of trust” system. It allows me to create a network of trusted reviewers. Slashdot
moderates its site based on similar principles. The community decides which
contributors and content is best and that information rises to the top. Virtual worlds, like
Second Life, have a social reputation system based on interactions between players.
Kuro5hin which uses mojo to allow users to moderate the site. Mojo is a time-weighted
average of comment ratings, in order to set the "initial" rating for each new comment.
Time spent with another player indicates friendship. New publishing models also rely
heavily on social reputation software to filter content. Outfoxed is a service that “uses
your network of trusted friends and experts to help you find the good stuff and avoid the
bad” by using social reputation as a criterion in web surfing. There is already a wide
variety of social reputation tools even though we are just at the beginning of their
evolution and are sure to see the development of a wide new array of technological
structures designed to measure social reputation. See Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark
Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for On-Line Identity, 84
WASH. U. L. Q. __ (2006).
See Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the
Legal Framework for On-Line 84 WASH. U. L. Q. __ (2006) (arguing that reputation systems
are crucial to fostering trust in online environments).
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See Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMM’N. OF THE ACM (Dec. 2000).
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submitting art deemed relevant by the community and even more points for art
that is eventually used in the final determination by the examiner. By tying
status to relevance, the institution of online peer review can encourage, not only
participation per se, but better quality participation and the submission of art
that is useful and practical.

Part V: Why Open Review

The open review system being constructed by the USPTO allows: 1)
submission of prior art and commentary in response to the pending application
of a consenting applicant; 2) where the community identifies the claims that are
most relevant; and 3) directions and tutorials create a strong ethos of community
and a clear indication about how to participate; and 4) participation is chunked
into manageable tasks, including the rating and ranking of other people’s
postings in order to produce a manageable top 10 list of prior art submissions;
and 5) successful participation, as determined by an examiner’s use of submitted
prior art, generates positive reputation points. This, in short, is the outline of an
open system that overcomes the problems of closed peer review while providing
more information into the decision making process in a manageable form.
The advantages to open review are myriad and we will discuss each one
of these in turn. In sum, it:
•

Eliminates the institutional and status boundaries of expertise

•

Reduces the work of administering peer review or public participation
and potentially accelerates decision making
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•

Improves decision making for the better by opening up the flow of
information while making it manageable

•

Makes government more accountable to science

•

Ensures that decisions comport with scientific fact

•

Will not only make more science available, it will reveal debates over that
science

•

Introduces information into the process early

•

Obviates the need to await litigation to challenge the basis of decision
making

•

Promotes deliberation around issues of national importance

•

Increases oversight over the regulatory process

•

Is more expert and more participatory
"When a handful of distinguished gentlemen came together in post-

Restoration England to set up the Royal Society, they agreed that membership
should be open only to the better sort. Allowing tradesmen and artisans to join
the collective search for truth seemed too dangerous to be tolerated, for, after all,
the worldly interests of such people might corrupt their decisions about what
counted as genuine knowledge."165 Open review abandons this now-outdated
vision of expertise.

In so doing, it can eliminate the problems of lack-of-

transparency and manipulation that plague closed peer review panels because it
opens up the process via the Internet, allowing peer reviewers to self-select,
rather than to be selected. If the aim is to get at good prior art, it does not matter

165

PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 29 (2001).
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where it comes from so long as it is provided. Often, the best wisdom comes, not
from the center, but from the periphery among the enthusiasts and hobbyists or
from graduate students who are immersed in but not yet well known for their
knowledge of the discipline. Opening up review also reduces the burden on any
one group of people over time by increasing the number of people potentially
engaged in the process.
In addition, opening up the process and eliminating closed boundaries
not only introduces more and better information from new sources, but it also
exercises a self-policing effect. Participants are not constrained by professional
allegiances nor do they become entrenched in the culture and practices of a
small, closed group. Scholarly debates are open playing-fields where everyone
participates in a common conversation. Similarly, an open system for science in
policymaking would provide greater accountability among scientists to each
other, regardless of whether they are in academia, industry or the public sector.
While there is an up front cost to setting up the software and the
processes by which open review will be conducted, it minimizes the workload
after the fact. There is no need to empanel juries or to police their boundaries.
As in the “Peer to Patent” system, the software can do the work of rating and
ranking participants and promoting the best submissions, as decided by the
community, to the front of the queue for consideration. If the work to be done is
made as granular as possible, it further reduces the workload by allowing more
people to participate for less time.
It will potentially improve decision making by opening up the flow of
information from the public and from the scientific community while, at the
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same time, leveraging technology to make that flow manageable for participants
and government officials alike.

The Peer to Patent Proposal166 suggests

transmitting only the top 10 items of prior art, as identified by the community, to
the patent examiner. We need to start exploring ways to embed procedure into
software in order to make public participation practicable and in order to let the
community itself participate in vetting the quality of information.
Having such processes readily deployable will make it possible to render
government more accountable to the scientific community and to integrate legal
and scientific considerations. It is possible and desirable, not to eliminate the
patent examiner, but to create a dialogue between the process of scientific factfinding and legal fact-finding.

Given that in the U.S. Patent Office (unlike

Europe) most examiners possess only an undergraduate degree in a science (and
not necessarily related to the area in which they examine) and that in other
agencies, “very few of the participants in the policymaking dialogue at high
levels within the Agency were scientifically trained,"167 open review integrated
into the decision making process creates mechanisms to inform the work of the
bureaucrat. Organizing the voice of science places added pressure on agencies to
make accountable decisions. It also reduces the risk of manipulation of science
by the agency.
Trying to separate science from law, as we have tried to do for so long, is
self-defeating. Science and policy are inextricably linked and should be. We
Peer to Patent proposal, please see Beth S. Noveck, Peer to Patent, 20 HARV. J. L. TECH.
___ (2006), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/proposals.html.
166

DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 210 (2005)
(quoting E. Donald Elliott, former EPA general counsel).
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need the mechanisms by which to let both areas of expertise inform but not
confuse or corrupt the way we make policy. We want to guard against regulatory
capture while, at the same time, harnessing collective expertise to advance the
public interest. “If told that it is improper to make policy recommendations,
scientific groups are much more likely to smuggle in their policy predilections
covertly, either consciously or unconsciously. We would be far better advised to
invite scientific advisory bodies to separate their scientific conclusions from their
policy recommendations, and to empower them to address both.168
The way to do this is by opening the process.
David Schoenbrod tells of an example where scientists and physicians
ripped to shreds the EPA's report on lead pollution that suggested levels of lead
pollution were safe.169 The report did not comport with scientific fact.

Open

review creates a way to address whether something is technologically feasible as
a matter of scientific fact (which may be a different question from whether it is
economically prudent).170 It lets the patent examiner know if there is, in fact, a
similar invention already invented or if his assessment of whether a particular
substitution of compound X for compound Y is really not obvious.
But open review not only makes more science available, it can reveal
debates over that science. “Good science is a chorus of independent expert voices
that come together with sufficient coherence and force to constrain policy,
structure debate, and influence policy. Rarely does good science dictate a unique
E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 45,
58-59 (2003).
168
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DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 32 (2005).
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DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 40 (2005).
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policy outcome; more often, it structures a policy dialogue among different
disciplines and constituencies by defining a problem and a range of options, but
it may also figure in the decision of which options to adopt.”171 A more open and
deliberative dialogue about science eliminates the concerns to which closed peer
review is prone, namely the fear that there may not be scientific consensus
around an issue. When we discuss whether an innovation is truly novel and
non-obvious, there may be disagreement. Airing that disagreement is helpful to
the process and informs how the examiner should proceed – how much time to
invest and the course to adopt – in doing his work.
This is also way to challenge bad science much earlier in the process
without having to wait for litigation.172

Reform proposals abound173 to change

the standard of judicial review for granted patents as well as for agency
determinations based on science.174 Scholars and practitioners have recognized

171 E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 45,
46 (2003).

See, e.g. Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review
Might Help, 19 BERK. TECH. L. J. (2004).

172

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman and Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad
Patents?, 28 REGULATION 10-13 (2005-6) (proposing 1) weakening the presumption of
validity, 2) allowing legitimate inventors to earn a presumption of validity and "goldplating" their patents by paying for more thorough searches, and 2) instituting postgrant opposition, "a process by which parties other than the applicant would have the
opportunity to request and fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent.").
173

For a discussion of a wide variety of reform proposals, see Matthew Sag and Kurt
Rohde, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent Reform (draft dated Aug 12, 2006)
(analyzing patent reform proposals through differential impact analysis), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc. See also Brendan
Chase, IBM Calls for Patent Reform, ZDNET, AUSTRALIA, 11 April 2005, available at
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/0,39023165,39187609,00.htm.
174
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the problems that arise with Chevron-deference to agency decision making.175
While this does not substitute for such reforms, open review does provide an
additional check – and one more expert than the courts – of the work of agencies.
Open review has another benefit that goes beyond the immediate process
of patent examination.

It promotes deliberation around issues of national

importance. “Such deliberation can lead individuals to revise opinions (about
both facts and values), alter premises, and discover common interests.
Disagreements and inconsistencies encourage individuals to balance and rank
their wants. The discovery that solely personal concerns are shared empowers
people to act upon them. Thus, public deliberation helps transform individual
valuations into social values; it helps forge collective purposes, and, even more
important, helps define and refine public morality. Through such deliberations,
individuals become citizens.”176 Engaging the entire scientific community in legal
decision making that is affected by science, promotes science education and
literacy.177

On the one hand, this benefits science and advances its role in our

society. On the other hand, it puts scientific knowledge to work for larger public
purposes by involving the public in peer review.

This democratizes the

Chevron U. S. A. V. Natural Resources Defense Council, et al., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ("We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has been consistently followed
by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory
policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.")

175

Robert Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94
YALE L.J. 1617, 1631-2 (1985); also Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy
in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber--Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2003).
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PHILIP KITCHNER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 142 (2001).
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conversation about science, promotes deliberation about issues of scientific
understanding and advances the goals of democratic participation.
This open process obviously increases oversight over the regulatory
process by another institution in addition to Congress and the courts. It allows
the public not only to vet but to produce the information on which regulatory
decisions are based. In the case of patent examination, this is essential. The
centralized examiner does not have access to the requisite information or knowhow to make informed decisions. Open review could be used, not only to help
the federal bureaucrat do his work, but also to provide the mechanism by which
to coordinate more regional processes of decision making and feedback and to
spur a conversation across levels of government.
Finally, open review is at once both more expert and more participatory
than peer review. It opens up the policymaking process to more members of the
scientific community and provides the platform by which to organize and
evaluate their input. This suggests a way forward that balances expertise with
accountability, science with democracy.

Conclusion: Institutional Competence and Patent Reform
Neither the Patent Reform Act of 2005 nor the Patents Depend on Quality
Act of 2006 has passed. While the Supreme Court heard several patent appeals
this year, it changed its mind and overturned its own grant of certiorari in
LabCorp v. Metabolite as improvidently granted.178 Had it moved forward, this

178

584 U.S. ___ (2006).
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case would have gone to the central question of the scope of patentable subject
matter.179 Patent reform has been incremental at best with no major changes to
the system since the Patent Act was enacted in 1952. Open peer review presents
an alternative avenue for legal reform by enhancing the institutional competence
of the Patent Office.

It focuses on the institution that makes the decisions and

employs the new communications practices that technology makes possible to
improve its work. Instead of seeking reform through the slower mechanism of
judicial review,180 this proposal addresses its administrative law antecedents by
revolutionizing the process of patent examination itself.181

A number of scholars have called for urgent reform of the scope of patentable subject
matter and have despaired of its failure to be enacted. For examples of the most recent
scholarship, see, Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought (2006); Eileen Kane, The
Dormancy and Revival of the Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine (2006); Sean M. O’Connor,
Using Science & Technology Studies to Redefine Patentable Subject Matter under the Progress
Clause of the Constitution (2006).
These unpublished papers are available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/schedule.html.
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cf., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1510
(2001) (arguing that because most patents are not of tremendous value, reform should be
ex post rather than ex ante) (“The strong implication of these numbers is that society
ought to resign itself to the fact that bad patents will issue, and attempt to deal with the
problem ex post, when the patent is asserted in litigation. This result is admittedly
counterintuitive. It depends crucially on the fact that very few patents are ever the
subject of litigation, or even licensing. Because of this, money spent improving the PTO
examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the ninety-five percent of
patents that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that don’t
crucially rely on the determination of validity”).
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See, e.g., Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent
Reform, Section B.1, p. 11ff (draft dated Aug 12, 2006) (focusing on examination related
reforms and discussing both this reform proposal and other patent office initiatives such
as limiting the applicant’s right to file continuations, streamlining examination by
requiring applicants to designate representative claims, changing the rules relating to
prior art search by applicants and their Information Disclosure Statements and offering
an avenue for “accelerated review), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc. The Patent Office
has catalogued its proposed rule changes online at: Proposed Rule Changes to Focus the
Patent Office in the 21st Century, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/focuspp.html (last
visited Aug. 17, 2006).
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This not only precipitates a rethinking of administrative reform,
generally, it demonstrates that it is possible to improve decision making by
enhancing the informational inputs into the process. Even were we to change the
legislative standards by which patent determinations are made, without
adequate information to enable a decision about what is novel and non-obvious,
reform is not possible. Agencies depend on good information to do their work –
whether it is determining patents or air quality – and they lack the institutional
mechanisms and the institutional culture to benefit from outside expertise.
Focusing on the Patent Office qua agency not only shifts the discourse of
reform to administrative practices, it makes the case for empirical and datadriven reform.182 The legal profession often prefers “anecdotes to tables”183 and,
with notable exceptions, there is a lack of empirical scholarship to support
legislative change.184

By designing and implementing a pilot to change

David A. Hyman, An Outsider Perspective on Intellectual Property Discourse, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 276, 278 (F. Scott Kieff, ed.)
(2003) (discussing evident lack of concern about the dearth of empirical evidence in legal
scholarship); see also Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and
legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002); Richard Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2002).
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David A. Hyman, An Outsider Perspective on Intellectual Property Discourse, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 279 (F. Scott Kieff, ed.)
(2003).
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For some of this recent empirical legal scholarship about intellectual property, see
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Cases (2006), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Beebe.pdf; William T.
Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Claims, available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Gallagher.doc; Paul Heald,
Copyright Ownership and Efficient Exploitation: An Empirical Study of American Works,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Heald.doc; Gregory
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, Patently Non-Obvious: How the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent
Decisions Irrational (2006); Lee Petherbridge and R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment fo the Law of Obviousness (2006),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/polk/petherbridge_obviousness.pdf. See also Mark A.
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workplace procedures, we can test the impact on the patent system. We can
ascertain if such measures promote the progress of the useful arts. Rather than
content ourselves with guesswork as to what legal reforms will address the
patent crisis – wondering whether changing the standard of judicial review or
reforming the obviousness standard will, in fact, improve patent quality -- open
patent review will allow us to demonstrate reform in practice by means of
defined metrics. We can inject more information into the process to inform
examination and test the results.

We can then lobby Congress for more

thoroughgoing legislative change on the basis of concrete data as to what works
and what does not work. Gathering data through empirical research shows how
we might conduct public participation and develop new models and new
technologies to solicit public, more specifically expert, input to improve
regulatory decision making.

Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking (July 12, 2006). Stanford Law
and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 324 Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=923468.
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